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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new dynamic and configurable approach to
anti-emulation malware analysis, aiming at improving transparency of ex-
isting analyses techniques. First of all, we test the effectiveness of existing
widespread free analyzers. We observe that the main problem of these anal-
yses is that they provide static and immutable values to the parameter used
in anti-emulation tests. Our approach aims at overcoming these limitations
by providing an abstract non-interference-based approach modeling the fact
that parameters can be modified dynamically, and the corresponding exe-
cutions compared.
Keywords: Anti-emulation malware, abstract non-interference, program
analysis
1 Introduction
The recent technological escalation led to a massive diffusion of electronic
devices among non-expert users. Nowadays, almost everybody has at least
one smart-phone, a personal computer or a tablet: these devices provide
permanent Internet connection to surf the Web, install applications and
keep in touch through social networks. A non-expert user installs around
one hundred apps, and uses only less than the half of them [4]. One of
the most widespread mobile OS is Android, that have reached more than
1 billion device activations in the last year, with an average of 1.5 million
activations per day [2]. By the way, there is another side of the coin: most of
the people has no idea of how dangerous could be granting wrong permissions
to a suspicious application. By installing software coming from untrusted
markets, without paying the right attention, a user may cause/introduce lots
of vulnerabilities on his system, such as privilege escalation, remote control,
financial charge and data leakage [27]. For instance, one in five Android
users faces a mobile threat, and the half of them installs trojans designed
to steal money [3]. These numbers are growing very fast, and this clearly
makes really important to pay attention to the security issue of Android
applications, and also to provide specific tools and frameworks for helping
users in enforcing their devices security.
The problem. In order to study malware payloads, it is necessary to an-
alyze these malicious software by using specific tools, based on emulation
and virtualization, which statically and dynamically analyze the code. The
problem is that some malware try to avoid these analyses by exploiting en-
vironment detection tricks which allow them to understand whether they
are emulated or not. These techniques are called anti-emulation checks [12]
or red pills [22]. If an anti-emulation check detects the presence of a virtual
environment, the malware changes its behavior showing only harmless execu-
tions, pretending to be another one or simply aborting the computation. In
the other case, the malware executes its payload, revealing its real nature and
intent. Malware authors use these checks to improve the efficiency and pro-
tection of their creations, taking advantage of virtualization discrepancies.
Since the original Rutkowska’s intuition, many works have been done in this
direction. Paleari et al. have proposed a method to automatize the creation
of red pills, generating thousands of mnemonic opcodes that trigger different
behaviors in real and emulated environments [17]. Futhermore, lots of anti-
emulation checks were find out for many different emulation environments
like QEMU, Bochs and VMWare [9, 14, 20, 21, 25]. On the other hand, sev-
eral tools were developed to reduce discrepancies between real and emulated
environments, trying to obtain perfect transparency [8, 13, 26]. However, in
desktop environments, the fight between malware authors and analysts have
reached a deadlock: as Garfinkel et al. observed [10], ”building a transpar-
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ent VMM1 is fundamentally infeasible, as well as impractical from a per-
formance and engineering standpoint”. Thus, VMM become defensive tools
where anti-emulation malware does not execute their malicious payloads.
Hence, the security focus moved to the mobile environment, in particular
Android, where virtualization on devices is inefficient and not widespread
nowadays. There are currently some Android analyzers available that scan
applications trying to extract their main features like permissions, services
or used networks. These results can be used to find out malicious behaviors
in Android applications by matching the samples with a database of known
malware. The problem, again, is that also Android malware started to em-
bed anti-emulation checks, making them resilient to analyses. In fact, in a
recent work Vidas and Christin [24] classified the known Android discrep-
ancies in different categories related to behavior, performance, components
and system design. Moreover, in [19], the authors show how simple is to
bypass analyzers by using trivial anti-emulation checks making most of the
analysis frameworks fail their responses, being unable to detect malicious
code. Hence, it is clearly necessary to develop new approaches to the fight
against the anti-emulation problem, which, first of all, should improve ex-
isting analyzers whose limits make them unable to face current malware.
Our approach. Our primary goal is to test the actual efficiency of the
main free widespread analyzers and the detection capability of anti-emulation
checks embedded in Android apps. We propose an in-depth investigation:
we consider 28 samples belonging to 15 different known malware families.
These tests have been conducted on 9 analysis frameworks available on-
line, such as Andrubis and VirusTotal. We analyze the obtained results,
providing a more specific perspective on the connection between the state-
of-the-art of anti-emulation techniques and our samples sources. This work
allows us to identify the limitations of the existing analyzers, such as the
lack of versatility and customization, usually caused by the general trend to
prefer better performance instead of stronger protection.
Another problem we observe, is that there are many solutions proposed,
but there is no formal frameworks that would allow us to semantically under-
stand the problem of anti-emulation. A semantic comprehension would be
very important for several reasons. Surely, it would allow us to compare dif-
ferent techniques, but, as we will show, it would also allow us to understand
how we can tune our analysis in order to adapt it to the different attacking
scenarios that a protection tool may have to face. In the existing literature,
there is only one attempt to formalize the notion of anti-emulation [12].
This notion formalizes precisely the intuition that anti-emulation is due to
an interference between the environment and the program execution. The
problem with this notion is that it is too strong, since benign applications
1Virtual Machine Monitor
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may change behaviors depending on the environment. For instance, an
application for handling images could change the definition of images de-
pending on the physical features of the device. For this reason, we would
like to tune which interferences are suspicious and which are acceptable, i.e.,
we need to weaken the admissible degree of interference between the envi-
ronment and the program. In the context of language-based security, the
problem of weakening non-interference has been widely studied. In the last
years it has been proposed a general formal framework [11] that we can use
for both modeling a weakening of what, of the environment, can interfere
with the program (so called declassification [15, 23]) and of what is ana-
lyzed about the program, namely the output observation of execution. This
framework, called abstract non-interference, provides a weakening of inter-
ference based on abstract interpretation [6, 7]. Namely, both the property
that can or cannot interfere with the output observation, and the observed
output observation are modeled as abstractions/properties of the concrete
semantics/behavior.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose an approach based on a for-
mal definition of anti-emulation, given in terms of abstract non-interference
[11]. In this way, we can capture malicious behaviors related to anti-emulation
in a more specific way: by using abstract non-interference we define anti-
emulation as an interference between the environment and the observable
application output, namely the behavior of the app. We use this definition as
a new formal framework where we can better understand how we can make
anti-anti-emulation checks stronger depending on the platform we work on.
This, in particular, allows us to improve existing analysis tools, providing
a first overview of an ideal analysis framework called Multiple Investigation
in Malware Emulation (MIME). The idea is that, by using an analyzer in
MIME style, a user could customize the input environment, manually setting
lots of parameters – such as IMEI2 and IMSI3 – so that he could observe dif-
ference in execution based on the chosen parameters. In this way, MIME is
able to mimic most of the existing analyzers by combining the input param-
eters in the desired manner. Our work is based on Android world, because
of the great impact of this mobile OS, but it could be easily adapted to other
architectures, by parameterizing the related anti-emulation checks.
2 Limitations of Existing Android Malware Anal-
yses
We started the test phase analyzing the anti-emulation checks in Android
well-known malware families. In our work, we consider: BadNews, Base-
2International Mobile Equipment Identity.
3International Mobile Subscriber Identity.
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Bridge, BgServ, DroidDream Light, Droid KungFu – 1, 2, 3, 4, Sapp, Up-
date –, FakeMart, Geinimi, Jifake, OBad and ZSone. For each malware fam-
ily, we chose two different variants to verify how frameworks react to small
code differences that are not related to malware payload – only in Jifake
and Droid KungFu Update this was not possible, because only one version
was available. We submitted all these samples to 9 different analyzers, free
and available with Web interface: AndroTotal Andrubis, APKScan, Dexter,
ForeSafe, Mobile-SandBox, VirusImmune, VirusTotal and VisualThreat. In
our test we submitted samples which were statically and dinamically ana-
lyzed or scanned by a pool of antivirus software: all the previous frameworks
could cover one or more of these categories. By summarizing, we collected
252 different combinations malware-analyzer that are fully available in [5]
for a more in-depth review. We observed that, in order to avoid emulation,
most of malware check several environment issues, such as constants in An-
droid Build class and/or other information as IMEI, IMSI and telephone
sensors management. Thus, in order to verify the behavior and, consecu-
tively, the presence of red pills in those malware, we mainly need dynamic
analysis: this means that the most complete results come from Andrubis,
APKScan, ForeSafe and VirusTotal. Nevertheless, we observe that even
these frameworks use trivial anti-emulation-related parameters such IMEI,
IMSI, etc. In Table 1, we show the results related to the IMEI and the IMSI
values in our target frameworks. Most of the considered analyzers han-
Analysis Framework IMEI Number IMSI Number
Andrubis 357242043237517 310005123456789
APK Scan 357242043237511 310260000000000
Foresafe 000000000000000 310260000000000
VirusTotal pseudorandom pseudorandom
Table 1: Default IMEI and IMSI values of the target frameworks.
dles these information statically, thus really easily checkable by a malware.
Only VirusTotal uses a pseudorandom IMEI and IMSI, but this solution is
strongly connected to the submitted sample - for instance different Virus-
Total executions on the same malware sample have the same IMEI. This
can be extended to the majority of the anti-emulation-related parameters
checked in other tests, revealing a deep weakness in these tools.
Other kinds of malware anti-emulation checks are provided in the follow-
ing examples, where other information is tested in order to break the trans-
parency of the virtual environment. In the following listings, some results
related to anti-emulation are shown, obtained by manually inspecting the
source code of the malware samples. Specifically, the source code in Listing 1
is taken from Geinimi sample, where there is an anti-emulation check that
tests the execution environment by inspecting the value of the android id,
that is set to null when the environment is virtual. If Geinimi finds a virtual
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environment it immediately alerts the Command and Control (C&C) server
by sending the string “Emulator” in the deviceId field. The souce code in
deviceId=android.provider.Settings.System.getString(context1.
getContentResolver () ,"android_id ");
if (deviceId == null){
deviceId = "Emulator ";
}
Listing 1: Geinimi anti-emulation check inspecting the android id value.
Listing 2 is taken from Obad sample. In this case, an obfuscation function
is applied to the code, but it is quite easy to observe that the if statement
contains a check concerning the value of the constant Build.MODEL. If it con-
tains default values, for example “sdk”, all the activities are closed. We can




Listing 2: Malware Obad anti-emulation check inspecting the value of
android.os.Build.MODEL.
observe that, also in these last examples, the anti-emulation checks involve
static values (deviceId and android.os.Build.MODEL) that, in standard
analyses cannot be customizable. In other words, most of the actual frame-
works do not provide the possibility to customize the configuration of the
virtual machine (in the following simply denoted VM) dynamically, making
really easy for a malware to detect the virtual environment.
Finally, the analyzers we considered in the test phase, do not allow multiple
execution in different virtual environments, but always provide the same
configuration for the VM, hence, if different executions in different envi-
ronments are required, it is necessary to manually upload the samples in
several frameworks. Moreover, this leads to discrepancies in the results be-
cause each analyzer decides which analysis information has to be considered
important, making analyses comparison really difficult and expensive.
All these limitations make the analysis of anti-emulation malware often
imprecise (being detected) and/or expensive. In the following, we start
from all these considerations in order to provide a stronger approach to




Given two sets S and T , we denote with ℘(S) the powerset of S, with SrT
the set-difference between S and T , with S ⊆ T inclusion. S∗ denotes the
set of all finite sequences of elements in S. A set L with ordering relation ≤
is a poset and it is denoted as 〈L,≤〉. A poset 〈L,≤〉 is a lattice if ∀x.y ∈ L
we have that x ∨ y and x ∧ y belong to L. A lattice 〈L,≤〉 is complete
when for every X ⊆ L we have that ∨X,∧X ∈ L. As usual a complete
lattice L, with ordering ≤, least upper bound (lub) ∨, greatest lower bound
(glb) ∧, greatest element (top) >, and least element (bottom) ⊥ is denoted
by 〈L,≤,∨,∧,>,⊥〉. Given f : S−→T and g : T−→Q we denote with
g ◦ f : S−→Q their composition, i.e., g ◦ f = λx.g(f(x)). f : L−→D on
complete lattices is additive if for any Y ⊆ L, f(∨LY ) = ∨Df(Y ).
Abstract Interpretation. Abstract interpretation [6,7] is a formal frame-
work used for reasoning on properties rather than on (concrete) data values.
We use this framework for modeling both the environment property to vary
and the malware analyzed property. The idea is that instead of observing the
concrete computation of programs, it is possible to observe only properties of
the computation. In other words, the malware detector operate on abstract,
approximate, semantics rather than on concrete, precise, semantics. Ab-
stract interpretation is a general theory for deriving sound approximations of
the semantics of discrete dynamic systems, e.g., programming languages [6].
Approximations can be formulated in terms of closure operators [7]. An
upper closure operator (uco for short) ρ : C → C on a poset C, representing
concrete objects, is monotone (it preserves order precision), idempotent (it
adds the whole approximation in one shot), and extensive (it may only add
information): ∀x ∈ C. x ≤C ρ(x). The upper closure operator is the function
that maps the concrete values to their abstract properties, namely with the
best possible approximation of the concrete value in the abstract domain.
For instance the abstraction Par, whose fixpoints are Par = {Z, ev, od,∅},
associates with each set of integer their sign if the integers have all the same
sign, top otherwise. Formally, closure operators ρ are uniquely determined
by the set of their fix-points ρ(C), for instance Par = {Z, ev, od,∅}. For
upper closures, X ⊆ C is the set of fix-points of ρ ∈ uco(C) iff X is a Moore-
family of C, i.e., X =M(X) def= {∧S | S ⊆ X} — where ∧∅ = > ∈M(X).
The set of all upper closure operators on C, denoted uco(C), is called lattice
of abstract interpretations of C [7], and it is a complete lattice when C is a
complete lattice.
Abstract Non-interference. Abstract non-interference (ANI) [11,15,16]
is a natural weakening of non-interference by abstract interpretation. Sup-
pose the variables of program split in private (H) and public (L). Let
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ρ, φ ∈ uco(VH × VL), where VL and VH are the domains of L and H vari-
ables. ρ characterizes the attacker, while φ is the property stating what, of
the private data, can flow to the output observation, also called declassifi-
cation. A program P satisfies ANI if ∀h1, h2 ∈ VH, ∀l ∈ VL:
φ(h1) = φ(h2) ⇒ ρ(JP K(h1, l)) = ρ(JP K(h2, l)). (1)
This notion says that, whenever the attacker is able to observe the output
property ρ, then it can observe nothing more than the property φ of the
input. This framework allows us to provide several characterizations con-
cerning non-interference, such as the maximal output observer unable to see
interferences or the maximal input information disclosed [11,16].
Observational Semantics and formal definition of anti-emulation.
In order to formally model anti-emulation, we have first to characterize what
we observe of the program execution. We focus here on Android applications
which are written in Java and compiled to Dalvik bytecode [1], with the
possibility to use a large part of the standard Java library. These features
make hard to provide a formal operational semantics to Android applications
[18]. To the best of our knowledge there is only one work aiming at providing
an operational semantics for Android programs, and in particular still only
for Android activities, whose scope is the development of a static analyzer
for Android [18]. Since the aim of our work is not to characterize a formal
semantics of Android application, but simply to provide a model of anti-
emulation, we suppose to fix an observation of the program execution, later
called semantics, that models what we observe of the application execution.
As future work it would be surely interesting to combine this definition of
anti-emulation with existing formal semantics in order to provide a more
precise characterization.
Let App be the set of applications, namely programs A running for Android.
According to the definition given by Kang et al. [12], we model the behavior
of a program A as a function depending on the input memory σ ∈ Mem and on
the environment E ∈ Env. An environment provides “all the aspects of the
system the program might query or discover, including the other software
installed, the characteristics of hardware, or the time of day” [12]. In order
to describe the actions performed by a program we consider a set of Events E
which describe the relevant actions performed by the application during its
execution, for instance instructions related to the Wi-Fi connection, making
phone calls or send an SMS to a certain number, or access to particular
information stored in the mobile phone. Let Σ = E × Mem be the set of
program states then, the observational semantics is:J·K : App −→ (Env× Mem→ ℘(Σ∗))
Given A ∈ App, JAK is a function providing the trace of events executed by
the program A depending on an hosting environment E and on an initial in-
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put σ, i.e., JAK : (E, σ) 7→ { τ ∣∣ τ = 〈e0, σ〉 . . . 〈en, σn〉, where ei ∈ E in E }.
So, the operational semantics of an Android application A ∈ App, writtenJAK(env, I), is all the execution tracks of the execution of the application A
in an environment env ∈ E with an input I.
To study anti-emulation means, in practice, to discover all the anti-
emulation checks that can be exploited in a virtual environment. Let us
recall the only formal characterization of anti-emulation [12].
We say that P uses anti-emulation techniques if its execution under a real
environment Er changes its behavior under an emulated environment Ee,
although input σ is the same and environments are very similar: JPK(Ee, σ) 6=JPK(Er, σ). In this case, 6= denotes the fact that the two executions are
”observationally” different.
4 ANI-based definition of Anti-emulation
Malware anti-emulation checks look for specific environment information in
order to understand whether the environment is virtual or not. This in-
formation is used to adapt the execution to the recognized environment, in
particular by hiding malicious behaviors when emulation is suspected.
We already underlined that in this field there are many “ad hoc” solutions
proposed, but there is no formal frameworks allowing us to semantically
understand the problem of anti-emulation. In the existing literature, there
is only one attempt to formalize anti-emulation [12] which is based on the
notion of non-interference. We show here that this notion is too strong for
really capturing the problem, and we propose a model based on abstract
non-interference (see Sect. 3). Non-interference, in general, is based on the
idea that we have some information to protect that has not to interfere with
the observable information. In the anti-emulation field, it is clear that the
information to protect is the “kind” (virtual or not) of execution environ-
ment: when a malware uses anti-emulation techniques there is a flow of
information from the “kind” of execution environment to the malware.
The M sets of events. Our approach, is based on what we observe of
the program executions, i.e., on the granularity of the set E . This set is also
important for modeling the events, namely the actions, considered suspicious
and therefore denoting the possible executions of malicious code. In order
to obtain this characterization we have to identify inside E the set M of the
suspicious/malicious events. The set M induces a partition of E : B def= E r
M is the set of all the supposed benign events. The set M can be extracted
depending on known information regarding the sample that we want to
analyze. For instance, when considering applications handling images could
be malicious whereas the action of sending an SMS, while this action is
perfectly acceptable for instant messaging Apps. Alternatively, we can use
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the common payloads investigated by Zhou and Jiang [27]. The content of
M are, for example, all the instructions regarding sending premium rated
SMS, data and information leakage from the device and also installation of
application without any request.
The Sel and Obs properties. Defining anti-emulation in terms of ab-
stract non-interference requires the definition of some abstractions. First of
all, we have to define an auxiliary map αE : Σ∗ → ℘(E ), extracting, from
sequences of states, i.e., pairs of events and memories, only the set of gener-
ated events. OE : ℘(Σ∗)→ ℘(E ) is then defined by additive lift. Let τ ∈ Σ∗
and X ⊆ Σ∗
αE (τ) =
{
∅ if τ = ε





At this point, the idea of abstract non-interference is to decide which vari-
ation is allowed and how this variation can be carried in the observable
output. This framework allows us to define a extremely flexible model of
anti-emulation where we decide the range of environments whose variation
should not be observable by the application. In other words, we can model
the transparency degree of the virtual environment. It is clear that, in or-
der to capture anti-emulation, in this range we need to have both real and
virtual environment. From the formal point of view, we have to decide how
we model environment variations. At the same time, we can decide which
part of the input has, instead, to stay unchanged among all the analyzed
executions. In general, since we aim at observing precisely how the environ-
ment affects the execution, we should have to leave unchanged all the other
inputs affecting computation.
We use these observations for defining the input abstraction SelE, which pre-
cisely model the only possibility of varying the environment inside the set
E: Let E ⊆ Env modeling the admitted range of variation for environments,
and σ ∈ Mem an input for the application A:
SelE : Env× Mem −→ ℘(Env× Mem) SelE(〈E, σ〉) =
{ 〈E, σ〉 if E ∈ E
〈E, σ〉 otherwise
Hence, we say that (E1, σ1) and (E2, σ2) are equal under the property SelE –
and we write SelE(E1, σ1) = SelE(E2, σ2) – if E1, E2 ∈ E are two environment
and σ1 = σ2. We abuse notation by denoting with SelE also its additive lift
to sets, and therefore the corresponding closure operator. It is clear that,
in order to detect anti-emulation, E should include both virtual and real
environments.
In the abstract non-interference framework, we can also tune what we
want to observe in output, namely which observable property has or has not
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to be sensitive to the input variation. In the anti-emulation context, we sim-
ply aim at observing whether the application shows only benign behaviors
or even malicious ones, depending on the variation of the input environ-
ment, hence we define ObsM as an abstraction providing a simple boolean
response: Let X ⊆ E
ObsM : ℘(E ) −→ {True, False}
ObsM (X) =
{
True if X ∩M 6= ∅
False otherwise
This definition of ObsM is functional to the purpose of observing the pres-
ence of benign executions and executions containing malicious events.
The Model. Starting from the notion of abstract non-interference [11,15]
we create a model for anti-emulation. The core of the definition is the flow
of information between the execution environment and the application be-
havior. Namely, if the application execution shows malicious events only in
some environment, we say that some anti-emulation mechanism are present.
Our definition strongly depends on the set M . Thus, fixed the set M and
given the abstractions Sel and ObsM defined above, an application A does
not use anti-emulation with respect to E and M if:
∀〈E1, σ1〉, 〈E2, σ2〉 ∈ Env× Mem. SelE(〈E1, σ1)〉 = SelE(〈E2, σ2〉)⇒
ObsM (OE (JAK(〈E1, σ1〉))) = ObsM (OE (JAK(〈E2, σ2〉)))
(2)
In other words, the malware does not contain any anti-emulation check,
with respect to the environment range E and the malicious actions setM , if
by varying the environment inside E we observe only malicious actions (the
malware does not contain anti-emulation checks) or only benign actions (the
model does not capture the correct anti-emulation checks of the malware
analyzed).
Observations. The formal model of anti-emulation we provide is strongly
dependent on the characterization of the sets E andM . This means that, the
accuracy of the model depends on the understanding and on the knowledge
we have of the application context. In particular, the way we approximate
the set M affects the presence of both false positives and negatives in the
quest of anti-emulation checks. If we under-approximate M we clearly in-
troduce false negatives, namely there may be anti-emulation malware that
are not recognized. On the other hand, if we over-approximate M , then
we introduce false positives since we can detect nonexistent anti-emulation
checks.
Another interesting observation concerns the definition of ObsM . In fact,
we can refine the observation of the environment interference on the ob-
servable behavior. For instance, if we consider a further partition of benign
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events, i.e., B = B1 ∪B2 ∪ . . . ∪Bn, we can, not only detect the presence
of anti-emulation checks as before, but we can also understand whether the
environment affects the “kind” (in terms of the provided partition) of events
(potentially benign) showed by the application. In this case, we could define
a function ObsB as follows: Let Bi the name given to the partition Bi, for
each i between 1 and n, and let X ⊆ E
ObsB : ℘(E ) −→ {True} ∪
{
Bi
∣∣ i ∈ [1, n] }
ObsB(X) =
{
True if X ∩M 6= ∅
Bi if X ⊆ Bi
5 Multiple Investigation in Malware Emulation (MIME)
An empiric approach in anti-emulation investigation is surely slow and time-
consuming: It is necessary to upload the same sample different times for
each analyzer to use – in our case at least four times for consulting dynamic
information. An easier and faster way could be the usage of a single analyzer,
but most of the time it is necessary to do multiple and parallel analyses. So,
there is no doubt that a single and customizable analyzer could be a better
solution.
5.1 The MIME strategy
The approach we propose is an analyzer architecture based in a configurable
VM. In this work, we propose a new approach called MIME – Multiple Inves-
tigation in Malware Emulation. We already observed that, existing analyses
use an environment setting which is static and immutable, in the sense that
they cannot be configurated depending on the application contexts, for in-
stance depending on the kind of malware we are analyzing. Moreover, from
our empirical studies we observed that the standard anti-emulation checks
are based on simple checks of specific parameters values, such as IMEI or
IMSI. Hence the problem of existing analyses is that these parameters are
set to fixed, and often trivial, values. This means that a truly transparent
analyzer should be able to provide the value that the malware expects from a
real environment. Unfortunately, it is quite unrealistic to find a value robust
to sets of different malware, and not simply to a specific one. The idea we
propose is precisely to consider the ANI definition of anti-emulation, where
we look for anti-emulation checks by analyzing malware several times, and
each time under different environment settings. In other words, we let the
input environment to vary, by setting a list of anti-emulation parameters
(such as IMEI, IMSI, . . . ), and we observe how the execution is affected.
At this point, our goal is the automation of this formal model by mak-
ing systematic the variation of the environment setting and automatic the
corresponding executions and comparisons. The main idea of MIME is to
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perform several executions depending a configurable environment, which is
systematically modified until we find an anti-emulation check (detected by
an evaluation function) or until we exhaustively explore the space of envi-
ronments we consider.
In Figure 1, we show this idea where the input is the malware M and the
machine state mem. The analyzer contains a module Environment setting
which generates all the different configurations for exploring the space of
environments to check. Each single execution of the malware inside the
analyzer provides in output an observed behavior. This behavior is then
evaluated for detecting the presence of anti-emulation checks.
Figure 1: Simple architecture of a MIME customizable analyzer.
Configuring MIME architectures. Let us deeper explain the idea of
systematic and automated environment setting. We propose to choose a
pool of n anti-emulation-connected input parameters. We associate with
each parameter a list of prearranged values, in order to automatize the
environment setting. It is worth noting, that both the set of parameters and
the corresponding values can be easily customized. In the MIME strategy,
we represent these parameters like rotors, and each value corresponds to
a rotor position: by changing only one position at a time, we can detect
which are the malware reactions. In particular, the idea is to explore the
space of combinations starting from the simpler tests and moving toward
the more sophisticated ones, i.e., higher position in rotors corresponds to
more transparent parameter values.
In Table 2 we show an example of rotor pool for MIME approach and, in
particular, in Table 3 it is shown an example of values of the IMEI rotor.
In general, let pi the i-th parameter, let Ri be the rotor for pi, and let
Vi be the set of values for pi. This idea, in our formal model corresponds
to consider a set Ei for each parameter pi, which simply corresponds to the
execution environment where the parameter pi is set to one of the values
in Vi, while all the other parameters are set to a default initial value. This
choice is necessary since we aim at understanding precisely whether the
parameter pi, and not others, may affect execution. In this case, we consider
Eq. 2, with input abstraction SelEi . Namely, the MIME strategy proposes
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Rotors Description
IMEI list of statical and pseudorandom IMEIs
IMSI list of statical and pseudorandom IMSIs
device model list of real and virtual device models
device version list of real and virtual device versions
SIM serial list of statical and pseudorandom SIM serials
calls the occurrence or absence of dialed/recived calls
SMS the occurrence or absence of sent/recived text messages
contacts the occurrence or absence of a contact list
battery level list of battery level in [0, 100]
DNS list of real and virtual DNS values
sensor mgmt the occurrence or absence of a proper sensor management
Table 2: An example of MIME approach rotors.
Rotor position IMEI Number Description
p0 000000000000000 Foresafe or standard VM IMEI
p1 357242043237511 Apk Scan IMEI
p2 357242043237517 Andrubis IMEI
p3 357242043237515 IMEI similar to Android analysis framework
p4 pseudorandom1 IMEI generated with specific random generators
p5 pseudorandom2 IMEI generated with specific random generators
p6 pseudorandom3 IMEI generated with specific random generators
p7 pseudorandom4 IMEI generated with specific random generators
Table 3: Example of a rotor related to device IMEI value.
to verify n times the Eq. 2, each time with respect one parameter pi, i.e.,
with respect to Ei.
Evaluating the observed behavior. In order to understand whether
we detect an anti-emulation check or not we need an evaluating process. In
particular, the evaluation function returns a boolean value identifying the
presence of at least one malicious action in M . This evaluation function is
used for detecting anti-emulation simply by comparing different executions,
namely if the malware, in one or more environments, executes some mali-
cious events, while in other environments its execution is harmless, we label
this difference as related to an anti-emulation check. Formally, the evalua-
tion corresponds to the function ObsM ◦OE which extracts from execution
traces the set of executed observable events, and it checks whether this set
contains some malicious events from M .
5.2 Using MIME for analyzing anti-emulation malware
In this section, we explain how we use the MIME strategy for improving
the transparency of existing analyses. It is clear that the price to pay is in
the performance of the analysis, but the interesting aspect of this strategy
is that each result we collect can be used to improve our knowledge of
existing anti-emulation techniques. In particular, the high flexibility of this
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approach allows us to easily implement any additional information we could
have on the malware to analyze. For instance, if we precisely know the kind
of anti-emulation test performed by the malware then we act only on the
rotors values concerning these tests, being completely useless to change other
values. Hence, the approach can be completely adapted to the particular
knowledge we have on the malware to analyze. It is clear, though, that
otherwise we have to check all the possibilities.
Let us explain the MIME strategy proposed in Listing 3 and in List-
ing 4. Let Rotors be the matrix of all rotors, each rotor i has a number of
possible different values maxi, for instance in Table 3 the IMEI rotor R1 has
max1 = 7, having 7 different possible values. Suppose to have n + 1 rotors,
then we define max as maximal value in
{
maxi
∣∣ i ∈ [0, n] }. Let M be the
analyzed malware, and mem the machine state memory. Config is the array
containing the n+1 positions of the rotors used for setting the environment.
Execute corresponds to the observation of the malware execution, formally
it corresponds to the observed semantics J·K where Config corresponds pre-
cisely to its environment input. Evaluate corresponds to the evaluation
function that, as we noticed before, is modeled by the output abstraction
ObsM ◦OE . Finally, position anti emu is the array of the rotor positions
where an anti-emulation check is detected by the evaluation.
Listing 3 implements the idea that we first compute the default configu-
ration of rotor parameters, whose evaluation val 0 is true if a malicious
action in M is observed. This corresponds to the worst possible VM for
detecting anti-emulation malware. Then we execute the malware in the
smarter configuration possible in our model, where the rotors are set to the
maximal values, and we evaluate in val m whether the corresponding ex-
ecution exhibits malicious events. If the two values are different it means
that somewhere in the code, there is an anti-emulation check, and therefore
we launch the function Catching anti emu looking for the identification of
the anti-emulation checks. If the two values are both equal to true then
it means that the malware does not use anti-emulation checks. Finally, if
the values are both equal to false, and we knew that it was a malware, it
means that it uses an anti-emulation check based on different parameters
or it uses a conjunctive combination of tests on the known parameters. We
lose this situation since we check parameters one at time. However, to the
best of our knowledge, based on the experimental results, this last situation
is not used by anti-emulation checks.
Listing 4 shows the pseudo-code of the function Catching anti emu. In
this case, we have to vary the environment setting looking for the parameters
responsible of the anti-emulation check. Since we aim at observing the
interference of each single parameter on the malware behavior, we let only
one rotor at time to change value, while all the others are set to default initial
values. For this reason, each time we finish to analyze the interference of
one rotor, we reset it before changing rotor. We always check all the rotors
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Function: Mime
Input: M, Rotors[n+1][ max],mem
result = null;
for each k in [0,n] Config[k]=0; // Environment reset (rotors initial
pos)
trace = Execute(M,Config ,mem);
val_0=Evaluate(trace);
for each k in [0,n] Config[k]= max_k; // Environment setting to max
rotors pos
trace = Execute(M,Config ,mem);
val_m = Evaluate(trace);
if (val_0 != val_m) result = to_string(Catching_anti_emu(M, Rotors ,mem
));
if (val_0 == val_m)
if (val_0) result = malware; // M is a malware without anti -
emulation
else result = pot_not_malware; //M is not recognized as
malware
Output: result
Listing 3: MIME approach in anti-emulation malware recognition.
since there may be more than one anti-emulation check. val becomes true
if some malicious action is detected, at this point since we know that there
was also an harmless execution (the routine is called only in this case), it
means that the current rotor contains an anti-emulation check in the current
position, that we store in position anti emu. At the end of the execution,
this vector contains all the rotor positions, namely the parameters values,
used in anti-emulation checks. If at the end this vector is all null, then it
means that the anti-emulation checks involve unobserved parameters or are
based on different techniques.
Function: Catching_anti_emu
Input: M, Rotors[n+1][ max],mem
position_anti_emu[n] = null;
for each i in [0,n] {
for each k in [0,n] Config[k]=0; // Environment reset
for each j in [0, max_i -1]{
Config[j]= Rotors[i,j];
trace = Execute(M,Config ,mem);
val = Evaluate (trace);
if (val) position_anti_emu[i] = j; break;
else j = j+1;
}
i = i+1; // change rotor
}
Output: position_anti_emu
Listing 4: Catching anti-emulation checks in MIME.
An example: The analysis of Obad. Let us consider the trojan mal-
ware for Android Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad – also known as Obad. It is
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able to send SMS to premium-rate numbers or downloading other malware.
It uses several techniques in order to thwart analyses, like code obfusca-
tion and anti-emulation. Our analyses conducted by Andrubis, APKScan,
VirusTotal and ForeSafe have collected no malicious events: they have just
highlighted lots of permissions required in manifest.xml, but not used in
practice [5]. Obad checks anti-emulation by investigating on the constant
android.os.Build.MODEL, and it closes all the running activities if a known
emulation-related value is recognized. By using MIME approach, Obad will
be forced to show its malicious behavior, even if it is executed in a virtual
environment. In order to analyze the payload of Obad, we should work with
the device model rotor (see Table 2), until we find the right device model
value that nullifies the Obad anti-emulation trick.
For example, the execution of Obad, with the VM device model configured
as “sdk”, does not show any malicious action, but if we set the device model
as a real mobile Android device, surely malicious actions are produced, such
as a premium-rate SMS sent.
This strategy works fine when the analyst already knows something
about the malware to study. In a scenario where Obad is a brand new mal-
ware and we want to use MIME strategy to understand what anti-emulation
check it implements, we have to work with all the rotors. For this malware,
the manipulation of parameters such as IMEI, IMSI or SMS will simply
not produce any malicious behavior, while only the device model rotor pro-
duces some differences in execution, related to the structure of the constant
Build.MODEL. In Table 4 we show a potential (partial) response of the exe-
cution of Mime on the malware Obad.
Rotors Obad Execution Results Position
IMEI rotor No malicious behavior found.
IMSI rotor No malicious behavior found.
device model rotor Malicious behavior found: SMS sent. 5
device version rotor No malicious behavior found.
. . . . . .
Table 4: An example of MIME examination of Obad.
6 Future Works
We develop our approach in the Android word since no much works have
been done heretofore in this field. However, our approach to anti-emulation
can be easly generalized to any platform. In this case, it is necessary to
change the Evironment setting and the VM, in order to let it analyze
desktop malware. Obviously, different rotors must be configured with pa-
rameters that are related to anti-emulation in desktop environments. Un-
til now, no implementation of our approach has been made, so a possible
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future implementation of MIME will be useful to successfully analyze anti-
emulation malware. Finally, our ANI model of anti-emulation is strongly
related to the definition of the M set of the malicious events. We would like
to improve this model and study in depth the relation between the M set
and the anti-emulation checks detection in malware.
+++Fuzzing, scalability, false positives
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Appendix: Test results
In this appendix we present our Summary Tables, which collect all the useful
information related to 252 different analyses on 28 malware samples.
In order to discover if anti-emulation techniques are common also in
Android malware, we investigate 15 different malware families: BadNews,
BaseBridge, BgServ, DroidDream Light, Droid KungFu 1, 2, 3, 4, Sapp,
Update , FakeMart, Geinimi, Jifake, OBad and ZSone.
We examined, where it was possible, 2 samples for each family, in order
to compare the results considering how analyzers react to different sam-
ples of the same family. The analyzers we used are: AndroTotal, Andru-
bis, APKScan, Dexter, ForeSafe, Mobile-SandBox, VirusImmune, VirusTo-
tal and VisualThreat.
Since no unified overview of the analysis was possible, we manually se-
lected all the useful information that came from analyses. In particular, we
selected anti-emulation related data, and we catalogue them in five sections,
as follows:
• General Information;
• Antivirus Scan and Name Distribution;
• Used Elements Analysis;
• Network Analysis;
• Potentially Dangerous Operations.
There follows a brief description of each section, focusing on the infor-
mation reported.
General Information This section contains the features of the .apk sam-
ple file, like its MD5 code and its dimension.
Antivirus Scan and Name Distribution This is the summary of 89
antivirus scans. In order to give a quick overview of the difference between
the two versions of each sample, we assigned a particular color depending
on the accuracy of the antivirus response. Table 5 shows the color legend
adopted.
In order to make more immediate the consultation of this Summary Ta-
bles, we also decided to take account of the name distribution: we assigned
to each scan a score, depending on the accuracy of the antivirus classifica-
tion. Table 6 shows the score legend adopted.
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Color Symbol Meaning
ruby red A malware was detected.
ruby red * A malware was detected in both of samples,
but the names are different.
bold italic red # A malware was detected in the sample B,
but no malware was detected in the sample
A.
red In the sample B the malware was detected
in a more specific way than in the sample A.
light green ˆ In the sample B the malware was detected
in a less specific way than in the sample A.
bold italic green $ A malware was detected in the sample A,
but no malware was detected in the sample
B.
Table 5: Color legend adopted in the Summary Tables.
Score Meaning
-1 No malware was detected.
0 The name assigned to the malware is completely wrong.
1 The name assigned to the malware is generic without any
specification about its family.
2 The name assigned to the malware is partially correct be-
cause it regards a family linked to the sample one.
3 The name assigned to the malware is correct (or an alias).
Table 6: Color legend adopted in the Summary Tables.
Used Elements Analysis In this section we present an overview of static
and dynamic information related to the sample source. In this section the
information represented concerns permissions declared and used, activities
and intents.
Network Analysis This is the most important section from an anti-
emulation standpoint. In this section are represented all the interaction of
the malware with the network: in particular we collect messages, HTTP/DNS
requests and network connections.
Potentially Dangerous Operations This is a review of VisualThreat
analysis, where we decided to show also some dynamic information. For








File Dimension (MB) 3.20
Package Name live.photo.savanna







Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab BadNews Preventon Andr/BadNews-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/BadNews PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat)
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB
Avast Android:BadNew-Z [PUP] Segurmatica




AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Androways.a Sophos Andr/BadNews-A
Baidu SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB Team Cymru Malware
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Trojan.Badnews TotalDefense 
CMC TotalDefense Cloud
Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.CF077D29





AndroidOS/BadNews.A.gen!Eldorado Trend Micro-Housecall ANDROIDOS_ADVINST.A
Digital Patrol TrustPort
DrWeb Android.Androways.1.origin TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB (B) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira









Ikarus AndroidOS.BadNews.A Detected 43
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Badnews Undetected 46
Jiangmin Sum 89
K7 Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 )






McAfee GW Name Amount Score
Microsoft InfoStealerBB 7 0
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Anways.cwyczq BadNews 16 3
NOD32 Android/BadNew.A Androways 6 2
NoraLabs NoraScan Generic Malware 10 1
Norman AndroidDOS_AdvInst 2 0
Norton Symantec Trojan.Gen.2 FakeInst 1 0














android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
Allows an application to open windows using the type 
TYPE_SYSTEM_ALERT, shown on top of all other applications
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT Allows an application to install a shortcut in Launcher 
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION °
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources 











Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 








Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.androways.advsystem.AdvService ! ! !
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
live.photo.savanna.MainActivity ! ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.androways.advsystem.AReceiver ! ! "
com.androways.advsystem.BootReceiver ! ! !









Hardcoded URLs IP Region
schemas.android.com - -
http://androways.com (malevolo) 91.226.212.65 Ukraine




Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
Phone_Number_Get Retrieve current phone number
SMS_Query List SMS
SMS 
Activities Notiﬁcation_Send Send notiﬁcations 
Monitor 
Activities
GPS_Spy Spy GPS states
Location_Spy Spy location
File 







Display line-by-line diﬀerences between pairs of 
text ﬁles
unix-mkdir Make a directory


















File Dimension (MB) 3.93
Package Name ru.blogspot.playsib.savageknife







Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder NO MALWARE $
Aegislab BadNews Preventon  Andr/BadNews-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/BadNews PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Win32/Trojan.f61 *
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat)
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB
Avast Android:InfoStealer-I [Trj] *^ Segurmatica
AVG Android/Generic.AP Segurmatica KE not-a-virus:HEUR:AdWare.AndroidOS.Anways.a
Avira Android/BadNews.A.Gen Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A * Sophos Andr/BadNews-A
Baidu SUPERAntiSpyware





Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.4D6AC939 *
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro ANDROIDOS_ADVINST.A, 
ANDROID.EC9F40F0




DrWeb Android.Androways.1.origin TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB (B) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira
eScan Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.BadNews.B *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB[b]
F-Prot VirusBuster
F-Secure Trojan:Android/InfoStealer.I *^ Zillya!
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.BadNews.A
FilsecLab Twister Android.BadNew.A.jwjr *
Fortinet Android/BadNews.A!tr.dldr
GData Android.Trojan.InfoStealer.BB
GFI Vipre Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A *
Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.BadNews * Detected 41
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Badnews Undetected 48
Jiangmin Sum 89
K7 Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 )





McAfee Artemis Artemis!5B08C96794AD *
McAfee GW Name Amount Score
Microsoft InfoStealerBB 9 0
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Anways.cwyczq BadNews 14 3
NOD32 Android/BadNew.A Androways 4 0
NoraLabs NoraScan Generic Malware 10 1
Norman AndroidDOS_AdvInst 2 0
Norton Symantec Trojan.Gen.2 FakeInst 1 0














android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
Allows applications to access information about WI-FI 
networks
android.permission.INSTALL_PACKAGES Allows an application to install packages
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES This constant was deprecated in API level 8
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor 
from sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT Allows an application to install a shortcut in Launcher 
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo
android.permission.FACTORY_TEST °
Run as a manufacturer test application, running as the root 
user android/content/pm/ApplicationInfo/Iﬂags
android.permission.INTERNET android/webkit/WebView









Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.google.ads.AdActivity  " ! "
ru.blogspot.playsib.savageknife.GameActivity ! ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.mobidisplay.advertsv1.AdvService ! ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.mobidisplay.advertsv1.BootReceiver ! ! "
com.mobidisplay.advertsv1.AReceiver ! ! !








Hardcoded URLs IP Region
mobidisplay.net 188.130.251.44 Russian Federation
e.admob.com 203.208.49.185 China - Beijing
schemas.android.com - -
media.admob.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
www.gstatic.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
media.admob.com 74.125.237.25 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS
googleads.g.doubleclick.net 74.125.237.25 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS
csi.gstatic.com 173.194.34.143 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS




Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
Network_NetProvider_Get Retrieve network provider information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
Phone_Number_Get Retrieve current phone number
SMS_Query List SMS
SMS 



































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.A Panda Generic Malware





AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/BaseBridge PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.BaseBridge.C
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir Androidos.basebrid.ae SecureIT Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.A
Avast Android:BaseBridge-L [Trj] Segurmatica








BitDefender Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.A Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker




Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Basebrid.Ahns





AndroidOS/BaseBridge.B Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_BASEBRIDGE.BLK
Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.BaseBrid.a TrustPort Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.G
DrWeb Android.Basebridge.4.origin TT Livescan

















Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.BaseBridge Detected 53











McAfee Artemis Artemis!E5108AAC09D9 Name Distribution
McAfee GW
Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/BaseBridge.B Name Amount Score
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.BaseBrid.cwyczu Anserver 1 2
NOD32
Android/BaseBridge.C,  
Android/BaseBridge.D Generic Malware 11 1
NoraLabs NoraScan Other 1 1
Norman doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen2.RWWNU BaseBridge 39 3













android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
Allows applications to access information about WI-FI 
networks
android.permission.CALL_PHONE
Allows an application to initiate a phone call without going 
through the Dialer user interface for the user to conﬁrm the 
call being placed
android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD Allows applications to disable the keyguard 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES This constant was deprecated in API level 8
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor 
from sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_APN_SETTINGS Allows applications to write the apn settings
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS Allows an application to write (but not read) the user's 
contacts data
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages




Run as a manufacturer test application, running as the root 
user android/content/pm/ApplicationInfo/Iﬂags
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/DatagramSocket














Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.battery.BalckActivity  " ! "
com.android.battery.BalckActivity2  " ! "
com.android.battery.KillThreeSixZero  ! ! "
com.keji.danti.Background  " ! "
com.keji.danti.Boutique  ! ! "
com.keji.danti.History  " ! "
com.keji.danti.Lists  " ! "
com.keji.danti.MainA  ! ! !
com.keji.danti.Setting  ! ! "
com.keji.danti.TextDetail  " ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.battery.BridgeProvider ! ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
com.android.battery.AdSmsService ! ! "
com.android.battery.PhoneService ! ! "
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.battery.BaseBroadcastReceiver ! ! !









Hardcoded URLs IP Region
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
schemas.android.com - -
wap.soso.com 220.181.124.2 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
dev.adtouchnetwork.net 54.72.9.51 United States - Woodbridge HTTP POST / DNS
dev.adtouchnetwork.net 61.155.178.159 China - Nanjing HTTP POST
tx.cookier.co.cc 112.175.243.12 South Korea - Seul DNS
b3.cookier.co.cc 112.175.243.12 South Korea - Seul DNS
clock.isc.org 149.20.64.28 United States - Palo Alto DNS
- 51.9.72.54.in-addr.arpa United Kingdom DNS
- 199.2.137.140 United States HTTP GET / POST
Potentially Dangerous Operations 
Name Description
Info 
Leakage Unable to Analyze 
SMS 
Activities Unable to Analyze 
Monitor 
Activities Unable to Analyze 
File 
Operations Unable to Analyze 
Network 
Activities TAINT_IMSI b3.cookier.co.cc:8080 (2 times)
Embedded 




























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.A Panda Generic Malware
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab BaseBridge Preventon Andr/Ansver-A,  
Andr/BBridge-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/BaseBridge PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.BaseBridge.C
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir NO MALWARE $ SecureIT Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.A
Avast Android:BaseBridge-L [Trj] Segurmatica




AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.BaseBridge.c Sophos  Andr/Ansver-A, 
 Andr/BBridge-A
Baidu Trojan.Android.BaseBridge.bC SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.A Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Basebridge-28 TotalDefense AndroidOS/MalAndroid
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Win32/Ponmocup!CTYNVFB *,  
Win32/Ponmocup!CcQYGd
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Basebrid.Hryf *




Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_AGENTBLK.200 *
Digital Patrol NO MALWARE $ TrustPort Android.Trojan.BaseBridge.G
DrWeb Android.Basebridge.4.origin TT Livescan









FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.BaseBridge.F *





Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.BaseBridge Detected 51
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Anserver-1 Undetected 38




K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0048d5051 )
Kaspersky HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.BaseBrid.a Name Distribution
Kingsoft Troj.Lotoor.a.(kcloud) *
MalwareBytes Name Amount Score
McAfee Lotoor 1 2
McAfee Artemis Artemis!936162A5CDFC * AgentBLK 2 0
McAfee GW Anserver 1 2
Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/BaseBridge.B Generic Malware 10 1
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.BaseBrid.cwyczu Other 1 1
NOD32 Android/BaseBridge.C,  
Android/BaseBridge.D
BaseBridge 35 3
NoraLabs NoraScan Ponmocap 1 0
















android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.CALL_PHONE
Allows an application to initiate a phone call without going 
through the Dialer user interface for the user to conﬁrm the 
call being placed
android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD Allows applications to disable the keyguard 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES This constant was deprecated in API level 8
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 
sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_APN_SETTINGS Allows applications to write the apn settings
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS
Allows an application to write (but not read) the user's contacts 
data
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages






Run as a manufacturer test application, running as the root 
user android/content/pm/ApplicationInfo/Iﬂags
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/DatagramSocket














Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.battery.BalckActivity  " ! "
com.android.battery.BalckActivity2  " ! "
com.android.battery.KillThreeSixZero  ! ! "
com.keji.danti.Background  " ! "
com.keji.danti.Boutique  ! ! "
com.keji.danti.History  " ! "
com.keji.danti.Lists  " ! "
com.keji.danti.MainA  ! ! !
com.keji.danti.Setting  ! ! "
com.keji.danti.TextDetail  " ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.battery.BridgeProvider ! ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
com.android.battery.AdSmsService ! ! "
com.android.battery.PhoneService ! ! "
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.battery.BaseBroadcastReceiver ! ! !









Hardcoded URLs IP Region
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
schemas.android.com - -
wap.soso.com 220.181.124.2 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
dev.adtouchnetwork.net 54.72.9.51 United States - Woodbridge HTTP POST / DNS
dev.adtouchnetwork.net 61.155.178.159 China - Nanjing HTTP POST
tx.cookier.co.cc 112.175.243.12 South Korea - Seul DNS
b3.cookier.co.cc 112.175.243.12 South Korea - Seul DNS
clock.isc.org 149.20.64.28 United States - Palo Alto DNS
- 51.9.72.54.in-addr.arpa United Kingdom DNS
- 199.2.137.140 United States HTTP GET / POST
Potentially Dangerous Operations 
Name Description
Info 
Leakage Unable to Analyze 
SMS 
Activities Unable to Analyze 
Monitor 
Activities Unable to Analyze 
File 
Operations Unable to Analyze 
Network 
Activities TAINT_IMSI b3.cookier.co.cc:8080 (2 times)
Embedded 





























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.BgServ.A Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab Fake10086 Preventon Andr/BBridge-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/BgService PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.BgServ.A
Antiy-AVL Trojan/win32.agent RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.BgServ.A
Avast Android:BGServ-G [Trj] Segurmatica










CMC TotalDefense Cloud Heur/Backdoor!CYeeNS
Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.8A60CE65





AndroidOS/BgServ Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_BGSRV.A
Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.SerBG.b TrustPort Android.Trojan.BgServ.A
DrWeb Android.Youlubg.2 TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.BgServ.A (B) VBA32 Backdoor.AndroidOS.SerBG.b
Epoolsoft Vexira









Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.Masnu Detected 51
Immunos Andr.BGServ-4 Undetected 38
Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.byz Sum 89
K7 Antivirus





McAfee Artemis Artemis!E5108AAC09D9 Name Amount Score
McAfee GW Bgserv 30 3
Microsoft TrojanSpy:AndroidOS/Lanucher.A BaseBridge 2 0
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.SerBG.cwydad Generic Malware 11 1
NOD32 Android/Bgserv.B Fake10086 (alias) 2 3
NoraLabs NoraScan Youlubg (alias) 1 3
Norman doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen2.PMXQX Lanucher 3 2
Norton Symantec Backdoor.Trojan Masnu 1 0
















Allows an app to access approximate location derived from 
network location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
Allows an app to access precise location from location 
sources such as GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
Allows applications to access information about WI-FI 
networks
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to change network connectivity state 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor 
from sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage





android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId
android.permission.SEND_SMS android/telephony/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage
android.permission.VIBRATE ° Allows access to the vibrator android/app/NotiﬁcationManager;->Notify
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK android/os/PowerManager$WakeLock;->acquire








Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.mms.bg.ui.FakeLanucherActivity  ! ! !








com.virsir.android.chinamobile10086.ShortCut  ! ! !










Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties




com.virsir.android.chinamobile10086.SMSService ! ! "
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.mms.bg.transaction.PrivilegedSmsReceiver  ! ! !
com.mms.bg.transaction.SmsReceiver  ! ! !
com.mms.bg.ui.AutoSMSRecevier  ! ! !
com.mms.bg.ui.BootReceiver  ! ! !




Used Networks Toast Messages
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE 对不起，您的软件不⽀支持电⼦子市场
[Sorry, your software does not support  
the electronic market]
Network Analysis
Hardcoded URLs IP Region
apps.virsir.com 209.141.55.182 United States - San Jose
schemas.android.com - -
news.163.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
ent.163.com 112.25.33.28 China - Beijing
d.wiyun.com 119.254.87.201 China - Beijing
data.ﬂurry.com 117.144.231.200 China - Beijing
ajax.googleapis.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
tech.163.com 112.25.33.28 China - Beijing
money.163.com 111.1.53.220 China - Beijing
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
www.youlubg.com 59.188.232.71 Hong Kong
mmsc.monternet.com - -
gate.baidu.com 111.13.12.14 China - Beijing
211.136.165.53 211.136.165.53 China - Shanghai
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
data.ﬂurry.com 74.217.75.7 United States - Seattle HTTP POST / DNS
apps.virsir.com 209.241.55.182 United States / Canada HTTP GET / DNS
d.wiyun.com 119.254.87.201 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
- 13.203.52.216.in-addr.arpa United States - Norwalk DNS
- 182.55.141.209.in-addr.arpa Singapore DNS
- 201.87.254.119.in-addr.arpa Brasil DNS




Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Network_NetProvider_Get Retrieve network provider information
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI








SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Create_Message Create SMS Inbox
SMS_Delete_Message Delete SMS Inbox
SMS_Erase Delete SMS
SMS_Intercept Intercept SMS




GPS_Spy Spy GPS state
Location_SPY Spy location
File 
Operations File_Erase Delete ﬁle
Network 




unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval





























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.BgServ.A Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab Fake10086 Preventon Andr/BBridge-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/BgService PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.BgServ.A
Antiy-AVL NO MALWARE $ RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.BgServ.A
Avast Android:BGServ-G [Trj] Segurmatica
AVG Android/Serb Segurmatica KE HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.SerBG.a
Avira Android/SerBG.E * Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Lanucher.A Sophos Andr/BBridge-A 
 Andr/BBridge-A
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.SerBG.AXxB * SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.BgServ.A Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.BGServ-12 * TotalDefense
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Heur/Backdoor!CARQPFB *, 
Heur/Backdoor!CTaRNS *
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Serbg.Ajvh *£
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro AndroidOS_BGSERV.A *, 
Android.1543EFF9 *
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.EA2DB6C2!Olympus *, 
AndroidOS/BgServ.A *
Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_BGESRV.A *
Digital Patrol NO MALWARE $ TrustPort Android.Trojan.BgServ.A
DrWeb Android.Youlubg.1 * TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.BgServ.A (B) VBA32 Backdoor.AndroidOS.SerBG.d *
Epoolsoft Vexira
eScan Android.Trojan.BgServ.A[ZP] VirIT eXplorer Android.Bkd.BgServ.B *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.BgServ.A[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/BgServ.A * VirusBuster
F-Secure Trojan:Android/Bgserv.A Zillya!
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.Bgserv.B




Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.SerBG *£ Detected 48
Immunos Andr.BGServ-12 * Undetected 41
Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.cc * Sum 89
K7 Antivirus
K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 )
Kaspersky HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.SerBG.a
Kingsoft Troj.BgServ.a.(kcloud) Name Distribution  
MalwareBytes
McAfee Name Amount Score
McAfee Artemis Artemis!EA2DB6C29FDE * Bgserv 32 3
McAfee GW BaseBridge 2 0
Microsoft NO MALWARE $ Generic Malware 8 1
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.SerBG.cwydad Fake10086 (alias) 2 3
NOD32 Android/Bgserv.D * Youlubg (alias) 1 3
NoraLabs NoraScan Lanucher 2 2
Norman doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen2.QROZO * Other 1 1
Norton Symantec Android.Bgserv *£ Sum 48
nProtect













Allows an app to access approximate location derived from 
network location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
Allows an app to access precise location from location 
sources such as GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
Allows applications to access information about WI-FI 
networks
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to change network connectivity state 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, 
to record or perform processing on them
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor 
from sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage






android.permission.VIBRATE ° Allows access to the vibrator android/app/NotiﬁcationManager;->Notify
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query








Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.mms.bg.ui.FakeLanucherActivity  ! ! !








com.virsir.android.chinamobile10086.ShortCut  ! ! !





















! ! " Toast Messages
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! ! 对不起，您的软件不⽀支持电⼦子市场
[Sorry, your software does not support  
the electronic market]
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.mms.bg.transaction.PrivilegedSmsReceiver  ! ! !
com.mms.bg.transaction.SmsReceiver  ! ! !
com.mms.bg.ui.AutoSMSRecevier  ! ! !
com.mms.bg.ui.BootReceiver  ! ! !
com.mms.bg.ui.InternetStatusReceiver ! ! !





Hardcoded URLs IP Region
gate.baidu.com 111.13.12.14 China - Beijing
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
ajax.googleapis.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
tech.163.com 112.25.33.28 China - Beijing
schemas.android.com - -
data.ﬂurry.com 117.144.231.200 China - Beijing
d.wiyun.com 119.254.87.201 China - Beijing
news.163.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
apps.virsir.com 209.141.55.182 United States - San Jose
www.youlubg.com 59.188.232.71 Hong Kong
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
www.androidicons.com 80.237.132.63 Germany - Höst
ent.163.com 112.25.33.28 China - Beijing
money.163.com 111.1.53.220 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
data.ﬂurry.com 74.217.75.7 United States - Seattle HTTP POST / DNS
apps.virsir.com 209.141.55.182 United States / Canada HTTP GET / DNS
d.wiyun.com 119.254.87.201 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
- 13.203.52.216.in-addr.arpa United States - Norwalk DNS
- 182.55.141.209.in-addr.arpa Singapore DNS
- 201.87.254.119.in-addr.arpa Brasil DNS
- 7.75.217.74.in-addr.arpa United States - Columbus DNS




Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location







SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Delete_Message Delete SMS Inbox
SMS_Erase Delete SMS
SMS_Intercept Intercept SMS




GPS_Spy Spy GPS state
Location_SPY Spy location
File 
Operations File_Erase Delete ﬁle
Network 
Activities TAINT_IMEI d.wiyun.com:80 (5 times)
Embedded 


























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DDLight.D Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab DorDrae Preventon Andr/DDLight-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/LightDD PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.LightDD.B
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DDLight.D
Avast Android:DorDrae-A [Trj] Segurmatica
AVG Android_mc.IE Segurmatica KE HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.DorDrae.a
Avira Android/Lightdd.A.Gen Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.DDLight.b Sophos Andr/DDLight-A
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.DorDrae.aYm SUPERAntiSpyware







Comodo Malware Tencent Win32.Trojan-Downloader.Dordrae.nqk





AndroidOS/DroidDream.C Trend Micro-Housecall ANDROIDOS_DDLIGHT.SMA
Digital Patrol Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.DorDrae.cw TrustPort Android.Trojan.DDLight.D
DrWeb Android.DDLight.2.origin TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DDLight.D (B) VBA32 Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.DorDrae.cw
Epoolsoft Vexira













Immunos Andr.Trojan.DroidDreamLight Undetected 41
Jiangmin TrojanDownloader.AndroidOS.ek Sum 89
K7 Antivirus






McAfee Name Distribution  
McAfee Artemis Artemis!23FE7F094266
McAfee GW Name Amount Score
Microsoft TrojanSpy:AndroidOS/DDLight.B DroidDreamLight 30 3




NoraLabs NoraScan Altri 1 1
Norman Generic Malware 6 1













android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.CLEAR_APP_CACHE
Allows an application to clear the caches of all installed 
applications on the device
android.permission.DELETE_CACHE_FILES Allows an application to delete cache ﬁles
android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS
Allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts 
Service 
android.permission.GET_PACKAGE_SIZE
Allows an application to ﬁnd out the space used by any 
package
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user's contacts data
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION °
Allows an app to access precise location from location 
sources such as GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI android/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getCellLocation
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo
android.permission.FACTORY_TEST °





















Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.google.ads.AdActivity  " ! "
com.move.app2sd.App2SdActivity  ! ! "
com.move.app2sd.MainTab  ! ! !
com.move.app2sd.Preferences ! ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties




Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.move.app2sd.Receiver  ! ! !
com.move.app2sd.strategy.core.RebirthReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
sites.google.com 37.61.54.158 Azerbaigian - Baku
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
www.googleadservices.com 203.208.36.13 China - Beijing
schemas.android.com - -
c.admob.com 203.208.46.186 China - Beijing
googleads.g.doubleclick.net 203.208.46.185 China - Beijing
www.gstatic.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
a.admob.com 165.193.245.52 United States - Mountain View




App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information 
Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts














































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DDLight.D Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware #
Aegislab DorDrae Preventon Andr/DDLight-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/LightDD PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.LightDD.B
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DDLight.D
Avast Android:DorDrae-A [Trj] Segurmatica




AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.DDLight.b Sophos Andr/DDLight-A
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.DorDrae.AGXT * SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.DDLight.D Team Cymru Malware #
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Lightdd * TotalDefense
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Win32/Kelihos!CPWMaAB *, 
 Win32/Kelihos!CQaeZc *
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Trojan-downloader.Dordrae.Akov *
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro AndroidOS_DORDRAE.N *, 
Android.F3EDE361
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.E6892F11!Olympus *, 
AndroidOS/DroidDream.C
Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_DORDRAE.N *
Digital Patrol Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.DorDrae.cw TrustPort Android.Trojan.DDLight.D
DrWeb Android.DDLight.2.origin TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DDLight.D (B) VBA32 Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.DorDrae.bp *
Epoolsoft Vexira




FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.DDLight.SMA







Immunos Andr.Trojan.DroidDreamLight Undetected 38
Jiangmin TrojanDownloader.AndroidOS.y * Sum 89
K7 Antivirus
K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0048d6381 )
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.DorDrae.a
Kingsoft Android.Troj.DroidDream.b.(kcloud)
MalwareBytes Name Distribution  
McAfee
McAfee Artemis Artemis!E6892F111D13 * Name Amount Score
McAfee GW Kelihos 1 0
Microsoft TrojanSpy:AndroidOS/DDLight.B DroidDreamLight 29 3





NoraLabs NoraScan Altri 1 1
Norman doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen2.SMFRN # Generic Malware 8 1















Allows an app to access approximate location derived from 
network location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources 
such as GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS Allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user's contacts data
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting









android.permission.READ_LOGS ° Allows an application to read the low-level system log ﬁles java/lang/Runtime;->exec
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId
android.permission.SEND_SMS ° Allows an application to send SMS messages android/telephony/SmsManager;->sendMultipartTextMessage











Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.google.ads.AdActivity  " ! "
com.lesson.share.SuperShareActivity  ! ! !




com.lesson.share.contactsshare.Preferences  ! ! "
com.lesson.share.locationshare.Preferences  ! ! "
com.lesson.share.locationshare.Sharelocation  ! ! "
com.lesson.share.photoshare.PhotoShareActivity ! ! "







Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.lesson.share.appshare.Receiver  ! ! !
com.lesson.share.strategy.core.RebirthReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
c.admob.com 203.208.46.186 China - Beijing
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
schemas.android.com - -
sites.google.com 37.61.54.158 Azerbagijan - Baku
a.admob.com 165.193.245.52 United States - Mountain View
googleads.g.doubleclick.net 203.208.46.185 China - Beijing
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
www.googleadservices.com 203.208.36.13 China - Beijing
www.gstatic.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
juodaleety.com 69.43.161.174 Australia - Beaumaris HTTP POST / DNS
guyeoacdoo.com - - DNS
oucameyed.com - - DNS
iuoytread.com - - DNS
(oucameyed.com?) 208.73.211.161 United States - Los Angeles HTTP POST
(oucameyed.com?) 208.73.211.236 United States - Los Angeles HTTP POST
(oucameyed.com?) 209.99.40.222 HTTP POST




App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information 
Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Get Get contact
Contact_Query List contacts




















Activities TAINT_IMEI, TAINT_IMSI  oucameyed.com:80 (12 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-gzip Compress a ﬁle and add the extensi
unix-kill Terminate a process
unix-login Log in to the system
unix-md Make a directory
unix-mkdir Make a directory


























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A Panda Generic Malware





AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic




























BitDefender Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker




Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.DF7F9E55








Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a TrustPort Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.2 TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A (B) VBA32 Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a
Epoolsoft Vexira
























Name Distribution  
MalwareBytes Name Amount Score
McAfee DroidKungFuA 22 3




Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/DroidKrungFu.A Fokonge (alias) 3 3
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.KungFu.cvxvgh Gongfu (alias) 1 3
NOD32
Android/DroidKungFu.W.Gen, 
Android/DroidKungFu.Y Elf 1 1
NoraLabs NoraScan Generic Malware 10 1
Norman doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen3.AEOWP Other 1 1
















android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD Allows applications to disable the keyguard 
android.permission.INSTALL_PACKAGES Allows an application to install packages
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the system 
ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage










Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 







Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.google.ssearch.Dialog  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.FingerprintActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.HelpActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.SettingsActivity ! ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.google.ssearch.SearchService  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.SleepService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.google.ssearch.Receiver  ! ! !
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.BootReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
android.thinkchange.mobi 205.196.221.2 United States - Brea
search.gongfu-android.com 62.173.145.83 Russian Federation
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.167 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 163.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa France DNS





Retrieve package installation information   
(2 times)
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI






Operations OS_Kill Terminate a process
Network 
Activities Network_Access Access network (4 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval


























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A Panda NO MALWARE $
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder NO MALWARE $
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-N,  
Andr/KongFu-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Exploit.Kongfu.N66, 
Android.Kungfu.A
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising NORMAL:Trojan.Agent.fzv!1612479,  
DEX:System.Fokong
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud NORMAL:Trojan.Agent.fzv!1612479,  
DEX:System.Fokong
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A











AVware Exploit.Linux.Generic.Elf,  
Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidK
Sophos Andr/KongFu-N,  
Andr/KongFu-A
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.Az SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.KungFu-10 TotalDefense Kugfu.XAWM!suspicious
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Win32/Ldpinch!CdaLPFB *,  
Heur/Backdoor!CVbHHW
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Kungfu.Pdce *









Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a TrustPort Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.2 TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A (B) VBA32 Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a
Epoolsoft Vexira
eScan Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A[ZP] VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.KungFu.AE
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/DroidKungFu.A VirusBuster
F-Secure Trojan:Android/DroidKungFu.C * Zillya!







Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu *,  
AndroidOS.DroidKungFu *
Detected 53
Immunos Andr.Trojan.DroidKungFu Undetected 36




K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0048d55f1 ) Name Distribution  
Kaspersky HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a
Kingsoft Win32.Troj.KungFu.re.(kcloud) *, 
Android.Troj.Kongfu.op.(kcloud)
Name Amount Score
MalwareBytes DroidKungFuA 22 3
McAfee DroidKungFu 15 3
McAfee Artemis Artemis!B34C011A8774 * KungFu (altre vers.) 3 2
McAfee GW Fokonge (alias) 3 3
Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/DroidKrungFu.A Gongfu (alias) 1 3
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.KungFu.cvxvgh Elf 1 1
NOD32 Android/DroidKungFu.W.Gen, 
Android/DroidKungFu.Y
Generic Malware 6 1
NoraLabs NoraScan Other 1 1
Norman doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen3.AEOWP Ldpinch 1 0
Norton Symantec Android.Fokonge Sum 53
nProtect














android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the system 
ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 
sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
















Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.google.ssearch.Dialog  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.AboutActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.AdvancedActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.Home  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.InfoActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.IntroActivity  ! ! !
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.PerﬂockActivity  " ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.ProﬁleEditActivity  " ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.ProﬁlesActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.Setcpu  " ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.StresstestActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.WidgetConﬁgActivity ! ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.google.ssearch.SearchService  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.ProﬁlesService  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.StartupService  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.WidgetService ! ! "
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.google.ssearch.Receiver  ! ! !
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.StartupReceiver  ! ! "
com.tutusw.phonespeedup.Widget ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
android.thinkchange.mobi 205.196.221.2 United States - Brea
search.gongfu-android.com 62.173.145.83 Russian Federation
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.163 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 163.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa France DNS





Retrieve package installation information   
(2 times)
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI






Operations OS_Kill Terminate a process
Network 
Activities Network_Access Access network (4 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.C Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic






















CMC TotalDefense Cloud Heur/Backdoor!CVLZXY
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Kungfu.Pabv





AndroidOS/DroidKungFu.B Trend Micro-Housecall Suspicious_GEN.F47V1201
Digital Patrol TrustPort Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.C
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.12 TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.C (B) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira
eScan Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.C[ZP] VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.KungFu.IJ
F-Mirc VIRobot
F-Prot ELF/Andr/KungFu.A VirusBuster
F-Secure Trojan:Android/DroidKungFu.Q Zillya! Trojan.DroidKungFu..1






















MalwareBytes Name Distribution  
McAfee
McAfee Artemis Artemis!4247A3B9AE98 Name Amount Score
McAfee GW DroidKungFuB 2 3
Microsoft Trojan:Linux/DroidKrungFu DroidKungFuC 10 3
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.KungFu.cvxvgh DroidKungFu 9 3
NOD32
Android/DroidKungFu.F,  
Android/DroidKungFu.K KungFu (altre vers.) 13 2
NoraLabs NoraScan Gongfu (alias) 2 3
Norman Generic Malware 8 1















android.permission.BROADCAST_STICKY Allows an application to broadcast sticky intents
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/Socket
android.permission.READ_LOGS ° Allows an application to read the low-level system log ﬁles java/lang/Runtime;->exec
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId





Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.AdvancedSettings  ! ! "
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.EditConﬁg  ! ! "
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.EditConﬁgPreferences  ! ! "
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.EnterPassphrase  ! ! "
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.EnterUserPassword  ! ! "
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.ImportFiles  ! ! "
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.OpenVpnSettings ! ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.service.OpenVpnService  " ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.tutusw.onekeyvpn.util.BootCompletedReceiver ! ! !







You need to install 'OI File Manager' from the market!
No directory selected!
Selected directory does not exists!
Selected ﬁle must be a directory!
VPN DNS is only supported in one tunnel!
您的⼿手机不符合本软件运⾏行的要求，您需要先root您的⼿手机！您可以选择z4root、Androot Universal、
visionaryplus等软件进⾏行root！ 
[Your phone does not meet the requirements to run this software, you need to root your phone!  
You can choose z4root, Androot Universal, visionaryplus or other software]
Network Analysis
Hardcoded URLs IP Region
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.160 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 160.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa South Africa DNS
Potentially Dangerous Operations 
Name Description
Info 
Leakage Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
SMS 









unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval


















File Dimension (MB) 0.70
Package Name com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner







Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.L *^ Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-A
Agnitum Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.B # Protector Plus Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.B #
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Exploit.DroidKungFu.C3 *,  
Exploit.Lotoor.C29 *
Antiy-AVL Backdoor/AndroidOS.KungFu, # Exploit/Linux.Lotoor # RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.L *^
Avast
ELF:KungFu-C,  
ELF:Lootor-E *,  
ELF:KungFu-A * Segurmatica
AVG Sexy * Segurmatica KE Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.z *
Avira Android/Malmix2.3 *, 
EXP/Linux.Lotoor.P *
Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.a Sophos Andr/KongFu-A
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.Ap * SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.L *^ Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.KungFu-8 # TotalDefense Kugfu.XAWM!suspicious #,  AndroidOS/KungFu #
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Heur/Backdoor!CKYTWFB *,  
Heur/Backdoor!CcCRNY *
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Kungfu.Egny *
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro ANDROIDOS_KUNGFU.HATA *, 
Android.8E8C2A0A
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.FD92A299!Olympus *,  
AndroidOS/DroidKungFu.A *^
Trend Micro-Housecall ANDROIDOS_KUNGFU.HATA *£
Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a # TrustPort Android.Exploit.Exploid.G *^
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.6 *,  
Android.Gongfu.8 *
TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.L *^ (B) VBA32 Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a #
Epoolsoft Vexira Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.B #
eScan Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.L *^ [ZP] VirIT eXplorer  Exploit.Linux.Lotoor.X *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.B[b] #,  Trojan.Linux.A.EX-Lotoor.7032 #
F-Prot AndroidOS/DroidKungFu.A * VirusBuster Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.B #
F-Secure Trojan:Android/DroidKungFu.A * Zillya! Trojan.DroidKungFu..6 *
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.A *^




GData Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.L *^ Detected 56





Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.hd *,  
Exploit.Linux.ao *
K7 Antivirus Name Distribution  
K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0048d55f1 ) *
Kaspersky Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.z * Name Amount Score
Kingsoft Android.Troj.KillAll.b.(kcloud) * KillAll 1 0
MalwareBytes Sexy 1 0
McAfee Lotoor 2 0
McAfee Artemis Artemis!FD92A299DD5E *, 
Artemis!2D782F81C83D *
DroidKungFuB 6 3
McAfee GW DroidKungFuC 5 3
Microsoft Trojan:Linux/DroidKrungFu.A *^ DroidKungFu 11 3
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.KungFu.cvxvgj *£ KungFu (altre vers.) 20 2
NOD32 Android/DroidKungFu.C *£,  
Android/DroidKungFu.X.Gen *
Gongfu (alias) 2 3
NoraLabs NoraScan Generic Malware 7 1
Norman Other 1 1


















android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD Allows applications to disable the keyguard 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED 
that is broadcast after the system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator









Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 







Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.eguan.state.Dialog  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.FingerprintActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.HelpActivity  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.SettingsActivity ! ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.eguan.state.StateService  ! ! "
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.SleepService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.eguan.state.Receiver  ! ! !
com.tutusw.ﬁngerscanner.BootReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
android.thinkchange.mobi 205.196.221.2 United States - Brea
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.168 - HTTP POST / DNS
- 168.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa United States - Hightstown DNS




App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information  
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI













unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Kungfu.C
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D
Avast Android:Fokonge-C [Trj] Segurmatica




AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.c Sophos Andr/KongFu-A
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.ao SUPERAntiSpyware







Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Kungfu.Stka





AndroidOS/AdrAds.A Trend Micro-Housecall ANDROIDOS_KUNGFU.HBT
Digital Patrol TrustPort Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.2.origin TT Livescan




Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.KungFu.AJ
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/AdrAds.A VirusBuster
F-Secure Trojan:Android/DroidKungFu.gen!65232C Zillya! Trojan.DroidKungFu..7










Immunos Andr.Trojan.DroidKungFu Undetected 38
Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.il Sum 89
K7 Antivirus





Name Distribution  
MalwareBytes
McAfee Name Amount Score
McAfee Artemis Artemis!5520FEC164F4 Domob 1 2
McAfee GW Wooboo 1 0
Microsoft Trojan:Linux/DroidKrungFu.C AdrAds 2 0
NANO AntiVirus
Riskware.Android.Wooboo.cthjxd, 
Trojan.Android.WqM Fynloski 1 0
NOD32
Android/DroidKungFu.G,  
Android/DroidKungFu.R.Gen Fokonge (alias) 2 3
NoraLabs NoraScan DroidKungFuD 7 3
Norman doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen2.TMOQA DroidKungFu 12 3
Norton Symantec Android.Fokonge KungFu (altre vers.) 14 2
nProtect Gongfu (alias) 1 2




















Allows an app to access precise location from location sources 
such as GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS
Allows an application to access extra location provider 
commands 
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.GET_TASKS This constant was deprecated in API level 21
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to read from external storage
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator 
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 
sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage










android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query










Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
cn.domob.android.ads.DomobActivity  ! ! "
com.adwo.adsdk.AdwoAdBrowserActivity  " ! "
com.google.update.Dialog  ! ! "
com.gp.tiltmazes.SelectMazeActivity  " ! "
com.gp.tiltmazes.TiltMazesActivity  " ! !
com.waps.OﬀersWebView " ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.google.update.UpdateService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
ccom.google.update.Receiver ! ! !








正在下载,请稍候... [Loading, please wait]
正在准备下载,请稍候... [Preparing to download, please wait]
加载中,请稍候... [Loading, please wait]
Network Analysis
Hardcoded URLs IP Region
clk.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
r2.adwo.com 42.62.76.8 China - Beijing
imp.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
www.adwo.com 42.62.76.6 China - Beijing
www.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.10 China - Beijing
blk.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
cus.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
app.wapx.cn 219.234.85.220 China - Beijing
e.domob.cn 58.83.143.20 China - Beijing
r.domob.cn 58.83.143.24 China - Beijing
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
ads.wapx.cn 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
cfg.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.2 China - Beijing
cfg.adsmogo.com 117.144.231.202 China - Beijing
req.adsmogo.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
cfg.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
app.wapx.cn 219.234.85.238 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
ads.wapx.cn 219.234.85.236 China - Beijing HTTP POST / DNS
code.google.com 74.125.237.5 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS
- 2.31.182.115.in-addr.arpa United Kingdom DNS
- 243.85.234.219.in-addr.arpa - DNS
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.166 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 166.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa United States - Kingsport DNS




App_Get_Tasks Retrieve running task information
App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information 
Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location
Network_Provider_Get Retrieve network provider information
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
Phone_IMSI_Get Retrieve IMSI
Phone_Number_Get Retrieve current phone number
SMS_Query List SMS
SMS 
Activities Notiﬁcation_Send Send notiﬁcations
Monitor 
Activities





OS_Kill Terminate a process
Network 
Activities TAINT_IMEI, TAINT_IMSI app.wapx:80 (3 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-compress Compress a ﬁle
unix-gzip Compress a ﬁle and add the extension .gz
unix-md Make a directory
unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval






























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-B *
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Kungfu.C
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising DEX:System.Fokonge!1.9DA8 #
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D
Avast Android:Fokonge-C [Trj] Segurmatica
AVG Android/KungFu *£, 
Android/Kungf *
Segurmatica KE HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a
Avira Android/DroidKungFu.A.Gen,  
Android/KungFu.cz.1 *
Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.c Sophos Andr/KongFu-B *
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.aLh *, 
Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.AjX *
SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Trojan.DroidKungFu TotalDefense AndroidOS/KungFu #,  Kugfu.XAVN!suspicious #
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Heur/Backdoor!CRYJPFB *,  
Heur/Backdoor!CeUYbc *
Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.649ED9F3 *^
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro ANDROIDOS_KUNGFU.HATA *, 
ANDROID.DDA41826 *
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.8344C2CD!Olympus *, 
AndroidOS/AdrAds.A
Trend Micro-Housecall Suspicious_GEN.F47V0105 *^
Digital Patrol TrustPort Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.A
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.2.origin TT Livescan





VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.KungFu.FW *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/AdrAds.A VirusBuster
F-Secure Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D * Zillya! Trojan.DroidKungFu..5 *
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.SMA
FilsecLab Twister Android.M.hﬁb *
Fortinet Adware/Waps.G *, 
Android/DroidKungFu.AW!tr.bdr *
Gdata Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.D Detected 52






K7 Antivirus Name Distribution  
K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0048d5431 ) *




MalwareBytes AdrAds 2 0
McAfee Fokonge (alias) 2 3
McAfee Artemis Artemis!8344C2CD2A36 * DroidKungFu D 8 3
McAfee GW DroidKungFu 13 3
Microsoft NO MALWARE $ KungFu (altre vers.) 12 2
NANO AntiVirus Riskware.Android.Wooboo.cthjxd, 
Trojan.Android.WqM
Gongfu (alias) 1 3
NOD32 Android/DroidKungFu.G,  
Android/DroidKungFu.AB.Gen *
Generic Malware 12 1
NoraLabs NoraScan Other 1 1
Norman  doslegacy/Suspicious_Gen2.TMOQA Sum 52


















android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Allows an app to access approximate location derived from network 
location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources such as 
GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS Allows an application to access extra location provider commands 
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to read from external storage
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages





android.permission.GET_TASKS ° This constant was deprecated in API level 21 android/app/ActivityManager;->getRunningTasks
android.permission.INTERNET android/webkit/WebView
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query









Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.adwo.adsdk.AdwoAdBrowserActivity  ! ! "
com.adwo.adsdk.AdwoSplashAdActivity  ! ! "
com.google.ads.AdActivity  " ! "
com.google.update.Dialog  ! ! "
com.mogo.gongfupuzzle.Main  ! ! "
com.mogo.gongfupuzzle.begin  ! ! !
com.vpon.adon.android.WebInApp  " ! "
com.waps.OﬀersWebView " ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.google.update.UpdateService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
ccom.google.update.Receiver ! ! !







加载中,请稍候... [Loading, please wait]
正在下载,请稍候... [Loading, please wait]
正在加载 [Loading]
Network Analysis
Request IP Region Type
cfg.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
app.waps.cn 219.234.85.220 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
cus.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
ads.waps.cn 219.234.85.237 China - Beijing HTTP POST / DNS
appcdn.wapx.cn 61.156.157.181 China - Jinan HTTP GET / DNS
appcdn.wapx.cn 60.221.236.138 China - Taiyuan HTTP GET / DNS
app.wapx.cn 219.234.85.238 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
- 2.31.182.115.in-addr.arpa United Kingdom DNS
- 243.85.234.219.in-addr.arpa - DNS
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.168 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
imgcdn.wapx.cn 101.226.200.182 China - Shanghai HTTP GET / DNS
storage.adsmogo.com 119.188.139.105 China - Jinan HTTP GET
cus.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.2 China - Beijing HTTP GET
Hardcoded URLs IP Region
app.waps.cn 219.234.85.243 China - Beijing
ditu.google.cn 117.144.231.200 China - Beijing
ditu.google.com 74.125.235.161 United States - Mountain View
imp.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
ads.waps.cn 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
blk.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
www.adwo.com 42.62.76.6 China - Beijing
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
schemas.android.com - -
cus.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
gad.ju6666.com - -
clk.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.7 China - Beijing
r2.adwo.com 42.62.76.8 China - Beijing
tw.ad.adon.vpon.com 202.153.194.26 Taiwan
sites.google.com 37.61.54.158 Azerbaigian - Baku
googleads.g.doubleclick.net 203.208.46.185 China - Beijing
a.admob.com 165.193.245.52 United States - Mountain View
219.234.85.214 219.234.85.214 China - Beijing
c.admob.com 203.208.46.186 China - Beijing
maps.google - -
beta.vpon.com 114.34.173.45 Taiwan - Taipei
www.gstatic.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
req.adsmogo.com 117.144.231.206 China - Beijing
www.googleadservices.com 203.208.36.13 China - Beijing
www.youtube.com 203.98.7.65 New Zeland - Waikanae
cn.ad.adon.vpon.com 114.80.83.204 China - Shanghai
cfg.adsmogo.com 117.144.231.202 China - Beijing
www.vpon.com 202.153.194.29 Taiwan
www.adsmogo.com 115.182.31.10 China - Beijing
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing




App_Get_Tasks Retrieve running task information
App_Info_Get
Retrieve package installation information  
(3 times)
Call_Query List phone call records (3 times)
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information (4 times)
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location (5 times)
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location
Network_Provider_Get Retrieve network provider information (3 times)
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI (7 times)
Phone_IMSI_Get Retrieve IMSI (2 times)





SMS_Create_Message Create SMS Inbox
SMS_Query List SMS (3 times)
Monitor 
Activities
GPS_Spy Spy GPS states
Location_Spy Spy location
File 
Operations OS_Kill Terminate a process
Network 
Activities
Network_Access Access network (18 times)
TAINT_IMEI app.waps.cn:80 or alias (14 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-compress Compress a ﬁle
unix-cp Copy a ﬁle
unix-diﬀ Display line-by-line diﬀerences between pairs of text ﬁles
unix-gzip Compress a ﬁle and add the extension .gz
unix-kill Terminate a process
unix-md Make a directory
unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval




























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.F Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Kungfu.F
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising









AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.e Sophos Andr/KongFu-A
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.Auv SUPERAntiSpyware









Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.A6ECF066





AndroidOS/AdrAds.A Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_AGENTBLK.135
Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a TrustPort Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.C
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.3.origin TT Livescan













GData Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.F Detected 52














Name Distribution  
MalwareBytes Name Amount Score
McAfee Legana (alias) 1 3
McAfee Artemis Artemis!EBDB48DA2921 Wooboo 1 0
McAfee GW AdrAds 2 0
Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/Legana.A AgentBLK 2 0
NANO AntiVirus
Riskware.Android.Wooboo.cthjxd, 
Trojan.Android.WqM DroidKungFu 7 3
NOD32
Android/DroidKungFu.M.Gen,  
Android/DroidKungFu.M KungFu (altre vers.) 25 2
NoraLabs NoraScan Gongfu (alias) 1 3
Norman Generic Malware 12 1


















Allows an app to access approximate location derived from 
network location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to change network connectivity state 
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 
sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_APN_SETTINGS Allows applications to write the apn settings
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages





android.permission.FACTORY_TEST ° Run as a manufacturer test application, running as the root user android/content/pm/ApplicationInfo/Iﬂags
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/NetworkInterface
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query
android.permission.READ_LOGS ° Allows an application to read the low-level system log ﬁles java/lang/Runtime;->exec
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId
android.permission.VIBRATE ° Allows access to the vibrator android/app/NotiﬁcationManager;->notify
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS °
Allows an application to read (but not write) the user's browsing 







Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.adwo.adsdk.AdwoAdBrowserActivity  " ! "
com.safetest.common.app.ActivationActivity  " ! "
com.safetest.myapn.HelpActivity  " ! "
com.safetest.myapn.InitialActivity  ! ! !
com.safetest.myapn.PreferenceActivity  " ! "
com.safetest.myapn.ShowTips ! ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.google.update.UpdateService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.safetest.myapn.HiApnRotaterWidgetProvider  " ! !
com.safetest.myapn.HiApnSwitcherWidgetProvider  " ! !
com.safetest.myapn.HiApnWidgetProvider  " ! !
com.safetest.myapn.Receiver ! ! !









⽆无备份⽂文件  [No backup ﬁle]
您未选中任何运营商  [You have not selected any operator]
Network Analysis
Hardcoded URLs IP Region
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
www.adwo.com 42.62.76.6 China - Beijing
www.hidroid.net 115.182.0.81 China - Beijing
proxy.youdraw.cn 114.255.171.253 China - Beijing
schemas.android.com - -
bbs.hidroid.net 115.182.0.81 China - Beijing
gad.ju6666.com - -
r2.adwo.com 42.62.76.8 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
proxy.youdraw.cn 118.26.192.171 China - Beijing HTTP POST / DNS
r2.adwo.com 42.62.76.8 China - Beijing HTTP POST
r2.adwo.com 114.255.171.253 China - Beijing HTTP POST / DNS
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.164 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 164.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa United States - Kent DNS




App_Get_Tasks Retrieve running task information
App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information 
Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location
Network_Provider_Get Retrieve network provider information
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
Phone_IMSI_Get Retrieve IMSI
Phone_Number_Get Retrieve current phone number
SMS_Query List SMS
SMS 
Activities Notiﬁcation_Send Send notiﬁcations
Monitor 
Activities





OS_Kill Terminate a process
Network 
Activities TAINT_PHONE_NUMBER, TAINT_IMEI r2.adwo.com:80 (9 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-compress Compress a ﬁle
unix-gzip Compress a ﬁle and add the extension .gz
unix-md Make a directory
unix-mkdir Make a directory
unix-sleep Suspend execution for a speciﬁed interval





























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.F Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Kungfu.F
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.F
Avast Other:Malware-gen,  
Android:KungFu-GR *
Segurmatica
AVG Android_mc.A *,  
Android/AdWo
Segurmatica KE HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a
Avira Android/Malmix.952,  
Android/DroidKungFu.D.Gen
Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.e Sophos Andr/KongFu-A
Baidu NO MALWARE $ SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.F Team Cymru Malware
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Trojan.DroidKungFu TotalDefense Kugfu.XAVN!suspicious,  
AndroidOS/MalAndroid
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Heur/Backdoor!CdfGEHB *,  
Heur/TrojanHorse!CCAHEHB *
Comodo Malware Tencent Android.Trojan.Droidkungfu.Svrr *
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro AndroidOS_AGENTBLK.935 *, 
Android.A3DF2BB4 *
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.5C1F2F86!Olympus *, 
AndroidOS/AdrAds.A
Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_AGENTBLK.935 *
Digital Patrol NO MALWARE $ TrustPort Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.C
DrWeb Android.Gongfu.3.origin TT Livescan








FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.C





Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu Detected 50
Immunos Andr.Trojan.DroidKungFu Undetected 39
Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.bqk * Sum 89
K7 Antivirus




Name Distribution  
MalwareBytes Name Amount Score
McAfee AdWho 1 2
McAfee Artemis Artemis!5C1F2F86C4E3 * Legana (alias) 1 3
McAfee GW Wooboo 1 0
Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/Legana.A AdrAds 2 0
NANO AntiVirus Riskware.Android.Wooboo.cthjxd, 
Trojan.Android.WqM
AgentBLK 2 0
NOD32 Android/DroidKungFu.M.Gen,  
Android/DroidKungFu.M
DroidKungFu 9 3
NoraLabs NoraScan KungFu (altre vers.) 22 2
Norman Gongfu (alias) 1 3
Norton Symantec Trojan.Gen.2 Generic Malware 10 1


















Allows an app to access approximate location derived from network 
location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator 
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION °
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources 
such as GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI android/location/LocationManager;->getLastKnownLocation
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE android/net/wiﬁ/WiﬁManager;->getConnectionInfo
android.permission.FACTORY_TEST ° Run as a manufacturer test application, running as the root user android/content/pm/ApplicationInfo/Iﬂags
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/NetworkInterface
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query




Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 
sleeping or screen from dimming android/media/MediaPlayer;->start
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS °
Allows an application to read (but not write) the user's browsing 







Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.adwo.adsdk.AdwoAdBrowserActivity  " ! "
com.glu.android.dinercn.DinerDash2  ! ! !
com.glu.android.dinercn.ShowTips ! ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.glu.android.dinercn.UpdateService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.glu.android.dinercn.Receiver  ! ! !








Hardcoded URLs IP Region
proxy.youdraw.cn 114.255.171.253 China - Beijing
gad.ju6666.com - -
www.ss3.glu.com - -
mrc-stage.glu.com 64.75.10.61 United States - Chesterﬁeld
gcs.glu.com 64.75.10.55 United States - Chesterﬁeld
market.android.com 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
www.adwo.com 42.62.76.6 China - Beijing
r2.adwo.com 42.62.76.8 China - Beijing
schemas.android.com - -
mrc.glu.com 64.75.10.11 United States - Chesterﬁeld
Request IP Region Type
proxy.youdraw.cn 118.26.192.171 China - Beijing HTTP POST / DNS
r2.adwo.com 114.255.171.253 China - Beijing HTTP POST / DNS
r2.adwo.com 42.62.76.8 China - Beijing HTTP POST




Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Network_Provider_Get Retrieve network provider information
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
Phone_IMSI_Get Retrieve IMSI








SMS_Create_Message Create SMS Inbox





Operations File_Erase Delete ﬁle
Network 





























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.N Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-N
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic














AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A Sophos Andr/KongFu-N
Baidu Trojan.Android.DroidKungFu.AP SUPERAntiSpyware





Comodo Malware Tencent Android.Trojan.Droidkungfu.Wpsz





AndroidOS/DroidKungFu.V Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_TROJKungfu.A
Digital Patrol TrustPort
DrWeb TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.N (B) VBA32 Trojan.AndroidOS.KungFu.a
Epoolsoft Vexira

















Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.ulv Sum 89
K7 Antivirus






McAfee GW Name Distribution  
Microsoft
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.DroidKungFu.ddjjdf Name Amount Score
NOD32
Android/DroidKungFu.W.Gen,  
Android/DroidKungFu.Y DroidKungFuN 10 3
NoraLabs NoraScan DroidKungFu 4 3
Norman KungFu (altre vers.) 17 2
Norton Symantec Generic Malware 8 1












android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.BOOT_COMPLETED -
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.CLEAR_APP_CACHE
Allows an application to clear the caches of all installed 
applications on the device
android.permission.GET_TASKS This constant was deprecated in API level 21
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS Allows an application to modify global audio settings 
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the system 
ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO Allows an application to record audio 
android.permission.SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS This constant was deprecated in API level 7
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 
sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage




android.permission.READ_LOGS ° Allows an application to read the low-level system log ﬁles java/lang/Runtime;->exec
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE android/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId










Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.AgentDetialInfo  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.ChongZhiActivity  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.HistoryDetailActivity  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.InitOnlineActivity  ! ! !
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.OnlineActivity  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.SongListActivity  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.ZhiFuBaoChongZhiActivity  ! ! "
org.linphone.LinphonePreferencesActivity11 " ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.mjdc.sapp.service.BehindService  ! ! "
com.mjdc.sapp.service.ConnectService  ! ! "
org.linphone.LinphoneService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.mjdc.sapp.receiver.BootReceiver  ! ! !
com.mjdc.sapp.receiver.SigChangeReceiver  ! ! !
org.linphone.BootReceiver  ! ! !
org.linphone.NetworkManager  ! ! !
org.linphone.OutgoingCallReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
msp.alipay.com 110.75.143.31 China - Hangzhou
- 219.238.160.86 China - Beijing
www.linphone.org 94.23.19.176 France
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
- 219.238.160.86 China - Beijing HTTP GET
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.165 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 86.160.238.219.in-addr.arpa United Kingdom - Londra DNS
- 165.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa United States - Colorado Springs DNS
Potentially Dangerous Operations 
Name Description
Info 
Leakage App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information 
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
SMS 







Network_Access Access network (9 times)
TAINT_IMEI 219.238.160.86:80 (5 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-compress Compress a ﬁle
unix-mkdir Make a directory



























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.N Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware #
Aegislab DroidKungFu Preventon Andr/KongFu-N
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Exploit.Kongfu.N66,  
Android.Kungfu.A Suspicious *
Antiy-AVL Backdoor/AndroidOS.KungFu[:vcsii] # RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.N
Avast Other:Malware-gen,  
Android:KungFu-CD
Segurmatica
AVG Android_mc.XB * Segurmatica KE HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.KungFu.a #
Avira Android/DroidKungFu.AG * Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A Sophos Andr/KongFu-N
Baidu Trojan.Android.DroidKungFu.aNu * SUPERAntiSpyware





Comodo Malware Tencent Android.Trojan.Droidkungfu.Wpsz
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro AndroidOS_TROJKungfu.A, 
Android.AB251B38





EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu.N (B) VBA32 Trojan.AndroidOS.KungFu.a
Epoolsoft Vexira




FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.DroidKungFu.A











Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.ulv Sum 89
K7 Antivirus





McAfee Artemis Artemis!32E1EB3B5CD4 *
McAfee GW
Microsoft Name Distribution  
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.KungFu.cvyvkg *
NOD32 Android/DroidKungFu.W.Gen,  
Android/DroidKungFu.Y
Name Amount Score
NoraLabs NoraScan DroidKungFuN 11 3
Norman DroidKungFu 5 3
Norton Symantec KungFu (altre vers.) 18 2
nProtect Generic Malware 9 1












android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.BOOT_COMPLETED -
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.CLEAR_APP_CACHE
Allows an application to clear the caches of all installed applications on 
the device
android.permission.GET_TASKS This constant was deprecated in API level 21
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS Allows an application to modify global audio settings 
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that 
is broadcast after the system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO Allows an application to record audio 
android.permission.SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS This constant was deprecated in API level 7
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator 
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from sleeping 
or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
















Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.AgentDetialInfo  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.ChongZhiActivity  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.HistoryDetailActivity  ! ! "
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.InitOnlineActivity  ! ! !
com.aijiaoyou.android.sipphone.OnlineActivity  ! ! "




org.linphone.LinphonePreferencesActivity11 " ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.mjdc.sapp.service.BehindService  ! ! "
com.mjdc.sapp.service.ConnectService  ! ! "
org.linphone.LinphoneService ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.mjdc.sapp.receiver.BootReceiver  ! ! !
com.mjdc.sapp.receiver.SigChangeReceiver  ! ! !
org.linphone.BootReceiver  ! ! !
org.linphone.NetworkManager  ! ! !
org.linphone.OutgoingCallReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
msp.alipay.com 110.75.143.31 China - Hangzhou
219.238.160.86 219.238.160.86 China - Beijing
www.linphone.org 94.23.19.176 France
Request IP Region Type
219.238.160.86 219.238.160.86 China - Beijing HTTP GET
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.165 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 86.160.238.219.in-addr.arpa United Kingdom - Londra DNS
- 165.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa United States - Colorado Springs DNS




App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information (3 times)
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI (2 times)
Phone_Number_Get Retrieve current phone number del device
SMS 




Operations Os_Kill Terminate a process
Network 
Activities
Network_Access Access network (12 times)
TAINT_IMEI 219.238.160.86:80 (5 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-compress Compress a ﬁle
unix-mkdir Make a directory























Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Adware.Wapsx.A Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab SUSPICIOUS Preventon Andr/KongFu-O
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/KungFu PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat)
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Adware.Wapsx.A
Avast Android:DroidKungFuU-A Segurmatica
AVG Android_mc.BCJ Segurmatica KE
Avira Android/DroidKungFu.AN Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A Sophos Andr/KongFu-O
Baidu Trojan.Android.DroidKungFu.AN SUPERAntiSpyware





Comodo Malware Tencent Android.Trojan.Droidkungfu.Swuw





AndroidOS/Wooboo.A.gen!Eldorado Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_DROIDKUNGFU.CDE
Digital Patrol TrustPort
DrWeb TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Adware.Wapsx.A (B) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira

























NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Waps.demevm Name Distribution  
NOD32 Android/DroidKungFu.AN
NoraLabs NoraScan Name Amount Score
Norman Wooboo 1 0
Norton Symantec WAPS 9 2



















android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.GET_TASKS This constant was deprecated in API level 21
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION °
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources such 
as GPS, cell towers, and WI-FI android/location/LocationManager;->getLastKnownLocation
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo








Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.ps.keepaccount.Main  ! ! !
com.ps.keepaccount.activity.DemoApp  ! ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.activity.HistoryAccount  ! ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.activity.QueryAccount  ! ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.activity.TodayAccount  ! ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.activity.TypeAccount  ! ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.activity.TypeAccountList  ! ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.activity.WriteAccount  ! ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.dialog.CanlendarDialog  " ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.dialog.DateSelectorDialog  " ! "
com.ps.keepaccount.tabbar.ButtonDemo  ! ! "
com.waps.OﬀersWebView  " ! "
org.achartengine.GraphicalActivity " ! "
















加载中,请稍候... [Loading, please wait]
正在下载,请稍候... [Loading, please wait]
Network Analysis
Hardcoded URLs IP Region
app.waps.cn 219.234.85.243 China - Beijing
ads.waps.cn 117.144.231.205 China - Beijing
219.234.85.214 219.234.85.214 China - Beijing
Request IP Region Type
app.waps.cn 219.234.85.216 China - Beijing HTTP GET / DNS
ads.waps.cn 219.234.85.237
China - Beijing
HTTP GET / HTTP POST 
DNS
appcdn.wapx.cn 61.156.157.181 China - Jinan HTTP GET / DNS
- 216.85.234.219.in-addr.arpa United States - O' Fallon DNS




App_Get_Tasks Retrieve running task information
App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information 
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
SMS 




Operations File_Erase Delete ﬁle
Network 
Activities TAINT_IMEI app.waps.cn:80 (4 times)
Embedded 
Commands
unix-gzip Compress a ﬁle and add the extension .gz
unix-mkdir Make a directory


















File Dimension (MB) 0.25
Package Name com.android.blackmarket







Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab Meds Preventon Andr/FakeIns-AH
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/FakeInst PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat)
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV
Avast Android:Jifake-G Segurmatica
AVG Android/Fakeins Segurmatica KE  HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Meds.a
Avira Android/MalCrypt.A.Gen Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A Sophos Andr/FakeIns-AH
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.Meds.Ayxe SUPERAntiSpyware





Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Trojan.Meds.Wnms






EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV (B) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira
















MalwareBytes Name Distribution 
McAfee
McAfee Artemis Artemis!6A0E9CE34016 Name Amount Score
McAfee GW Fakemart 5 3
Microsoft JiFake 2 0
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.FakeInst.dgehia FakeInst 12 2
NOD32 Android/MalCrypt.B Meds 5 0
NoraLabs NoraScan MalCrypt 4 0
Norman Tnega 1 0
Norton Symantec Trojan.Gen.2 Generic Malware 6 1















android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, 
to record or perform processing on them
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/ServerSocket
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query
android.permission.SEND_SMS android/telephony/gsm/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage





Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.blackmarket.BlackMarketAlpha ! ! !





Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.blackmarket.SmsReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
ant.apache.org 192.87.106.229 Netherlands - Amsterdam
jakarta.apache.org 192.87.106.229 Netherlands - Amsterdam
marc.theaimsgroup.com - -
schemas.android.com - -
trill.cis.fordham.edu 150.108.68.29 United States - Bronx
www.apache.org 192.87.106.229 Netherlands - Amsterdam
www.jcraft.com 124.34.9.130 Japan - Tokyo








SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages









































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware #
Aegislab FakeMart * Preventon Andr/FakeIns-AH
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/FakeInst PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Malware.Radar01.Gen *^
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.FakeMart.A #
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising NORMAL:Trojan.Agent.gcn!1612563 #
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV
Avast Android:FakeInst-CJ * Segurmatica
AVG Android/Fakeins Segurmatica KE HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeMart.a *£
Avira Android/Agent.O.Gen *£ Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A Sophos Andr/FakeIns-AH
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.FakeMart.ao * SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Android.Trojan.Smssend-8 # TotalDefense NO MALWARE $
CMC TotalDefense Cloud
Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.8DC685FF *£
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro





EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV (B) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira
eScan Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.FakeMart.C *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.FakeInst.AV[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/FakeMart.A VirusBuster
F-Secure Trojan:Android/FakeInst.gen!65232C *£ Zillya!
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.FakeInst.C *£




Ikarus PUA.AndroidOS.PrevGame * Detected 44
Immunos Android.Trojan.Smssend-8 # Undetected 45
Jiangmin Trojan/AndroidOS.wei # Sum 89
K7 Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 ) #
K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 ) #
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeMart.a *£




McAfee Artemis Artemis!D002F0581A86 *
McAfee GW
Microsoft
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.FakeInst.dgehia Name Distribution 
NOD32 Android/TrojanSMS.Agent.OS *
NoraLabs NoraScan Name Amount Score
Norman Radar01 1 0
Norton Symantec Trojan.Gen.2 PrevGame 1 0





















android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/ServerSocket
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query
android.permission.SEND_SMS android/telephony/gsm/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage





Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.blackmarket.BlackMarketAlpha ! ! !




Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.blackmarket.SmsReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
www.gainpourtous.com 91.121.35.78 France - Lisses




jakarta.apache.org 192.87.106.229 Netherlands - Amsterdam
www.apache.org 192.87.106.229 Netherlands - Amsterdam
www.jcraft.com 124.34.9.130 Japan - Tokyo
Request IP Region Type
www.gainpourtous.com 91.121.35.78 France - Lisses HTTP GET / DNS
mathissarox.myartsonline.com 83.125.22.184 Germany - Kiel HTTP GET / DNS








SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Delete_Message Delete Inbox SMS
SMS_Erase Delete SMS
SMS_Intercept Intercept SMS





































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B Panda Generic Malware
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab Geinimi Preventon Andr/BBridge-A
Agnitum TrojanSpy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.C Protector Plus TrojanSpy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.C
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/Geimini PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Geimini.B
Antiy-AVL Trojan/AndroidOS.Geinimi[SPY] RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising DEX:System.Geimini!1.9DA5
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud




Generic5_c.EVL Segurmatica KE HEUR:Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.a
Avira Android/Geinimi.D Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Geimini.A Sophos Andr/BBridge-A
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.Geinimi.AicX SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Trojan.Geinimi-1 TotalDefense AndroidOS/Geinimi.B
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Win32/Trafog!CIEZec, AndroidOS/Trojan!CEDcKb
Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.B1C4884E





AndroidOS/Geimini.A Trend Micro-Housecall ANDROIDOS_GEINIMI.HRXA
Digital Patrol TrustPort Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B
DrWeb Android.Geinimi.31 TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B (B) VBA32 Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.bq
Epoolsoft Vexira TrojanSpy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.C











Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.Geinimi Detected 61
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Geinimi-1 Undetected 28
Jiangmin TrojanSpy.AndroidOS.ce Sum 89
K7 Antivirus Trojan ( 00352b281 )






McAfee Generic.hu Name Distribution
McAfee Artemis Artemis!AE80C82E3427
McAfee GW Generic.hu Name Amount Score
Microsoft TrojanSpy:AndroidOS/Geimini.A W32\Malware_fam 1 0
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Geinimi.cwzgmg Geinimi 44 3
NOD32 Android/Spy.Geinimi.D BaseBridge 2 0
NoraLabs NoraScan Trafog 1 0
Norman Suspicious_Gen3.ABJUU Generic Malware 12 1














android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Allows an app to access approximate location derived from network location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI




Allows an application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer user interface for the user to 
conﬁrm the call being placed.
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS Allows mounting and unmounting ﬁle systems for removable storage
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user's contacts data
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to record or perform processing on them
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES This constant was deprecated in API level 8
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER Allows applications to set the wallpaper 
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator 
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS Allows an application to write (but not read) the user's contacts data
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS Allows an application to read (but not write) the user's browsing history and bookmarks
com.android.browser.permission.WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS Allows an application to write (but not read) the user's browsing history and bookmarks
com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT Allows an application to install a shortcut in Launcher 
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION android/location/LocationManager;->getBestProvider
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE ° Allows applications to access information about networks android/net/ConnectivityManager;->getActiveNetworkInfo











Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor 






Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.mobclix.android.sdk.MobclixBrowserActivity  " ! "
jp.co.kaku.spi.fs1006.Paid.FS1006Activity  ! ! !
jp.co.kaku.spi.fs1006.Paid.activity.c.rFrfhCvj  ! ! !
jp.co.kaku.spi.fs1006.com.EntryScoreViewActivity  ! ! !
jp.co.kaku.spi.fs1006.mobclix.MobclixAdvertisingView ! ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties




Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by Third-
Parties
com.android.blackmarket.SmsReceiver ! ! !









Android SensorManager disabled, 1.5 SDK emulator crashes when using it... Make sure to connect SensorSimulator
Network Analysis
Hardcoded URLs IP Region
kaku3.sakura.ne.jp 59.106.13.109 Japan - Osaka
data.mobclix.com 54.235.97.215 United States - Ashburn
schemas.android.com - -
vc.mobclix.com 75.101.131.215 United States - Ashburn
www.mobclix.com 75.101.131.215 United States - Ashburn
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
ads.mobclix.com 54.235.97.215 United States - Ashburn
Request IP Region Type
data.mobclix.com 54.235.185.74 United States - Ashburn HTTP GET
kaku3.sakura.ne.jp 59.106.13.109 Japan - Osaka HTTP POST / DNS




App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information
Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location
Network_NetProvider_Get Retrieve network provider information
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
Phone_IMSI_Get Retrieve IMSI









SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Create_Message Create Inbox SMS





GPS_Spy Spy GPS states
Location_Spy Spy location
File 

































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B Panda NO MALWARE $
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder
Aegislab Geinimi Preventon Andr/BBridge-A
Agnitum NO MALWARE $ Protector Plus NO MALWARE $
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/Geimini PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Geimini.B
Antiy-AVL NO MALWARE $ RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising DEX:System.Geimini!1.9DA5
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir NO MALWARE $ SecureIT Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B
Avast Android:Geinim-A Segurmatica
AVG Android_mc.JBR *^ Segurmatica KE HEUR:Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.a
Avira Android/Geinimi.B.Gen * Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A *^ Sophos Andr/BBridge-A
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.Geinimi.ajHR * SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Trojan.Geinimi-1 TotalDefense NO MALWARE $
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Win32/Farﬂi!CSIYXe *,  
Win32/Farﬂi!COaLPb *
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Trojan-spy.Geinimi.Ebqy *£
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro ANDROIDOS_GEINIMI.MJ *, 
Android.9AEDA42F *
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.888CCA6E!Olympus *, 
AndroidOS/Geimini.B *
Trend Micro-Housecall ANDROIDOS_GEINIMI.MJ *
Digital Patrol TrustPort Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B
DrWeb NO MALWARE $ TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B (B) VBA32 Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.h *
Epoolsoft Vexira NO MALWARE $
eScan Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B[ZP] VirIT eXplorer Android.Bkd.Geinimi.AD *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B[b]
F-Prot ANDR/Geinimi.B VirusBuster NO MALWARE $
F-Secure Trojan:Android/Geinimi.A Zillya!
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.Geimini.B
FilsecLab Twister Android.M.qixz *
Fortinet Android/Geinimi.H!tr *£
GData Android.Trojan.Geinimi.B
GFI Vipre NO MALWARE $
Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.Geinimi, 
AndroidOS.Suspect.Manifest *
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Geinimi-1 Detected 48
Jiangmin TrojanSpy.AndroidOS.co * Undetected 41
K7 Antivirus NO MALWARE $ Sum 89
K7GW Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 ) *
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Geinimi.a
Kingsoft Android.Troj.Geinimi.h.v.(kcloud) *, 
Android.Troj.hh_Geinimi.c.(kcloud) *
MalwareBytes
McAfee NO MALWARE $
McAfee Artemis Artemis!888CCA6E0A62 * Name Distribution
McAfee GW NO MALWARE $
Microsoft TrojanSpy:AndroidOS/Geimini.A Name Amount Score
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Geinimi.cwzgmg Geinimi 35 3
NOD32 Android/Spy.Geinimi.D BaseBridge 2 3
NoraLabs NoraScan Farﬂi 1 0
Norman Suspicious_Gen2.PXNEV * Generic Malware 9 1














Allows an app to access approximate location derived from 
network location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Allows an app to access precise location from location sources 




Allows an application to initiate a phone call without going 
through the Dialer user interface for the user to conﬁrm the call 
being placed.
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS Allows mounting and unmounting ﬁle systems for removable 
storage
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user's contacts data
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES This constant was deprecated in API level 8
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER Allows applications to set the wallpaper 
android.permission.VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator 
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS Allows an application to write (but not read) the user's contacts 
data
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS Allows an application to read (but not write) the user's browsing 
history and bookmarks
com.android.browser.permission.WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS Allows an application to write (but not read) the user's browsing 
history and bookmarks
com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT Allows an application to install a shortcut in Launcher 










android.permission.WAKE_LOCK ° Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 








Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
cmp.netsentry.list.c.f  ! ! !
cmp.netsentry.ui.ApplicationPreferences  ! ! !
cmp.netsentry.ui.ChartInterfaceStats  " ! !
cmp.netsentry.ui.InterfaceStatsEditor  ! ! !
cmp.netsentry.ui.InterfaceStatsList ! ! !
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
cmp.netsentry.list.c.AndroidIME " ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
cmp.netsentry.backend.Bootstrapper  ! ! !
cmp.netsentry.backend.Resetter  ! ! !
cmp.netsentry.backend.Updater  ! ! !
cmp.netsentry.backend.scheduler.CronScheduler  ! ! !
cmp.netsentry.list.f ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
schemas.android.com - -
maps.google.com 74.125.235.164 United States - Mountain View
Request IP Region Type
android.clients.google.com 173.194.116.167 United States - Mountain View HTTP POST / DNS
- 167.116.194.173.in-addr.arpa - DNS




App_Info_Get Retrieve package installation information
Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Location_Last_Get Retrieve last phone location
Network_NetProvider_Get Retrieve network provider information
Phone_IMEI_Get Retrieve IMEI
Phone_IMSI_Get Retrieve IMSI









SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Create_Message Create Inbox SMS






GPS_Spy Spy GPS states
Location_Spy Spy location
File 






unix-mkdir Make a directory


















File Dimension (MB) 1.19
Package Name appinventor.ai_russ_support.JimmRussia
Other Names 9440bb3da5e1ad862f357248b5da0c59dc7fc96b
Used Features android.hardware.touchscreen 
android.hardware.telephony
Antivirus Scan
Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.Jifake.A Panda Trj/Jifake.A
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab Jifake Preventon Andr/Jifake-C
Agnitum Trojan.AndroidOS.Jifake.B Protector Plus Trojan.AndroidOS.Jifake.B
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/FakeInst PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Jifake.F
Antiy-AVL RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising NORMAL:Trojan.Agent.gar!1612501
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir Trojan.SMS.AndroidOS.Jifake.f SecureIT Android.Trojan.Jifake.A
Avast Android:SMSSend-X Segurmatica




AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Jifake.a Sophos Andr/Jifake-C
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.FakeInst.avm SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender  Android.Trojan.Jifake.A Team Cymru Malware
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Jifake-9 TotalDefense AndroidOS/Tnega.cEVFZE
CMC TotalDefense Cloud Java/Jifake!CKbJIW
Comodo Malware Tencent Trojan.Android.Agent.CB4631F0





AndroidOS/Steek.C Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_JIFAKE.E
Digital Patrol Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Jifake.f TrustPort Android.Trojan.Jifake.A
DrWeb Android.SmsSend.26 TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.Jifake.A (B) VBA32 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Jifake.f
Epoolsoft Vexira Trojan.AndroidOS.Jifake.B
eScan Android.Trojan.Jifake.A[ZP] VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.JiFake.A
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.Jifake.A[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/Steek.C VirusBuster Trojan.AndroidOS.Jifake.B
F-Secure Trojan:Android/JiFake.gen!65232C Zillya!





Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.Jifake Detected 61
Immunos Andr.Jifake-9 Undetected 28
Jiangmin Backdoor/AndroidOS.cpv Sum 89
K7 Antivirus




Android.Troj.at_jifake.b.(kcloud) Name Distribution  
MalwareBytes
McAfee Android/SMS.gen Name Amount Score
McAfee Artemis Artemis!37A46AEC9AA8 Premiumtext 1 0
McAfee GW Android/SMS.gen SMS 3 1
Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/Jifake.B JiFake 34 3
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.FakeInst.cxcmjj FakeInst 5 2
NOD32 Android/TrojanSMS.Agent.E Tnega 1 0
NoraLabs NoraScan Steek 2 0
Norman SMSSend 2 0
Norton Symantec Android.Premiumtext Generic Malware 12 1
















android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION °
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources 




Allows an application to change whether an application 
component (other than its own) is enabled or not
android/content/pm/PackageManager;-> 
setComponentEnabledSetting
android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS ° Allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service android/accounts/AccountManager;->getAccounts
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/ServerSocket
android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS °




android.permission.READ_CONTACTS ° Allows an application to read the user's contacts data android/content/ContentResolver;->query
android.permission.READ_LOGS ° Allows an application to read the low-level system log ﬁles java/lang/Runtime;->exec





Allows an application to request authtokens from the 
AccountManager android/accounts/AccountManager;->getAuthToken
android.permission.VIBRATE ° Allows access to the vibrator android/app/NotiﬁcationManager;->notify
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK °
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor 



































Hardcoded URLs IP Region
www.gnu.org 208.118.235.148 United States - Boston
kawa.gnu.org - -
www.w3.org 128.30.52.45 United States - Cambridge
twitter.com 199.16.156.198 United States - San Francisco
appinvtinywebdb.appspot.com 173.194.67.141 United States - Mountain View
developer.android.com 74.125.232.128 United States - Mountain View
www.google.com 74.125.232.142 United States - Mountain View
appinvgameserver.appspot.com 173.194.67.141 United States - Mountain View
www.facebook.com 173.252.120.6 United States - Palo Alto
androvote.appspot.com 173.194.767.141 United States - Mountain View
smshelp.su 144.76.40.132 Germany - Kiez
Jimm5.ru 109.70.26.37 Russian Federation
stream.twitter.com 199.16.156.217 United States - San Francisco
status.twitter.com 66.6.44.4 United States - New York
yusuke.homeip.net 124.213.71.220 Japan
www.cs.caltech.edu 131.215.140.26 United States - Pasadena
schemas.xmlsoap.org 65.52.103.126 United States - Redmond




Call_Query List phone call records
Contact_Get Get contact
Contact_Query List contacts
GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location




SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Create_Message Create Inbox SMS
SMS_Query List SMS
SMS_Send Send "744155jimm" to 2476 (2 times)
Monitor 
Activities
GPS_Spy Spy GPS states
Location_Spy Spy location
File 
Operations File_Erase Delete ﬁle
Network 
Activities Network_Access Access network
Embedded 































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.Obad.A Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab Obad Preventon Andr/Obad-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/Obad PSafe Antivirus Android.Trojan.Obad.A
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Obad.A
Antiy-AVL Backdoor/AndroidOS.Obad[:vcsii] RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising DEX:System.Geimini!1.9DA5
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.Obad.A
Avast Android:Obad-A Segurmatica
AVG Android/Deng.OD Segurmatica KE HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a
Avira Android/Obad.a.3 Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A Sophos Andr/Obad-A
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.aLb SUPERAntiSpyware





Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Obad.Afqs
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro AndroidOS_OBAD.A
Cyren AndroidOS/Obad.A Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_OBAD.A
Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a TrustPort
DrWeb Android.Siggen.1.origin TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Trojan.Android.Obad (A) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira









Ikarus Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad Detected 53
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Obad Undetected 36
Jiangmin Sum 89
K7 Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 )






McAfee GW Android/Obad Name Distribution 
Microsoft
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Obad.dfttjr Name Amount Score
NOD32 Android/Obad.A Obad 41 3
NoraLabs NoraScan Geinimi 1 0
Norman Obad.B Deng 1 0
Norton Symantec Android.Obad Siggen 1 0













android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about WI-FI networks
android.permission.BLUETOOTH Allows applications to connect to paired bluetooth devices 
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN Allows applications to discover and pair bluetooth devices 
android.permission.CALL_PHONE
Allows an application to initiate a phone call without going 
through the Dialer user interface for the user to conﬁrm the call 
being placed.
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to change network connectivity state 
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE Allows modiﬁcation of the telephony state - power on, mmi, etc. 
android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS
Allows an application to see the number being dialed during an 
outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a diﬀerent 
number or abort the call altogether
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user's contacts data
android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to read from external storage
android.permission.READ_LOGS Allows an application to read the low-level system log ﬁles
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from 
sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS Allows an application to read or write the secure system settings
android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS Allows an application to read or write the system settings
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages















Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.system.admin.CCOIoll  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.cCoIOIOo ! ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.system.admin.MainService  ! ! "
com.android.system.admin.OCICooCI  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.OCOcCOll ! ! "
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.system.admin.CICoICCo  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.CoccOIo  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.ICcIIlo  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.IOOICOcI  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.OCllCoO ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
www.google.com 173.194.112.212 United States - Mountain View DNS
www.androfox.com 91.216.163.131 Lithuania HTTP POST / DNS




































File Dimension (MB) 0.08
Package Name com.android.system.admin








Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.Obad.A Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab Obad Preventon Andr/Obad-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/Obad PSafe Antivirus Android.Trojan.Obad.A
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Obad.A
Antiy-AVL Backdoor/AndroidOS.Obad[:vcsii] RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising NORMAL:Trojan.Agent.fxr!1612421 *£
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT NO MALWARE $
Avast Android:Obad-A Segurmatica
AVG Android/Deng.OD Segurmatica KE HEUR:Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a
Avira Android/Obad.a.2 * Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.A Sophos Andr/Obad-A
Baidu Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.AdT *, 
Trojan.Android.Obad.b
SUPERAntiSpyware





Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Backdoor.Obad.Efba *
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro AndroidOS_OBAD.A
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.F7BE25E4!Olympus *,  
AndroidOS/Obad.B *
Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_OBAD.A
Digital Patrol Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a TrustPort
DrWeb Android.Siggen.1.origin TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Trojan.Android.Obad (A) VBA32
Epoolsoft Vexira
eScan Android.Trojan.Obad.A VirIT eXplorer Android.Bkd.Obad.B *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.Obad.A[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/Obad.B * VirusBuster
F-Secure Trojan:Android/Obad.A Zillya!
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.Obad.A




Ikarus Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad Detected 52
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Obad Undetected 37
Jiangmin Sum 89
K7 Antivirus Trojan ( 0001140e1 )






McAfee GW Android/Obad Name Distribution 
Microsoft
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Obad.dfttmg * Name Amount Score
NOD32 Android/Obad.B * Obad 40 3
NoraLabs NoraScan Deng 1 0
Norman Obad.B Siggen 1 0













android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about networks
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
Allows applications to access information about WI-FI 
networks
android.permission.BLUETOOTH Allows applications to connect to paired bluetooth devices 
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN Allows applications to discover and pair bluetooth devices 
android.permission.CALL_PHONE
Allows an application to initiate a phone call without going 
through the Dialer user interface for the user to conﬁrm the 
call being placed.
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to change network connectivity state 
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state 
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE Allows modiﬁcation of the telephony state - power on, mmi, etc. 
android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS
Allows an application to see the number being dialed during 
an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a 
diﬀerent number or abort the call altogether
android.permission.RAISED_THREAD_PRIORITY -
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user's contacts data
android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to read from external storage
android.permission.READ_LOGS Allows an application to read the low-level system log ﬁles
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE Allows read only access to phone state
android.permission.READ_SMS Allows an application to read SMS messages
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Allows an application to receive the 
ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system ﬁnishes booting
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor 
from sleeping or screen from dimming 
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to external storage
android.permission.WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
Allows an application to read or write the secure system 
settings
android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS Allows an application to read or write the system settings
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Allows an application to write SMS messages















Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.system.admin.CCOIoll  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.cCoIOIOo ! ! "
Services Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.system.admin.AdminService  ! ! "
com.android.system.admin.CCOloCco  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.MainService ! ! "
com.android.music.MediaPlaybackService ! !
com.android.vending.util.WorkService ! !
Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.android.system.admin.AdminReceiver  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.CIcIoICo  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.OOOOlIO  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.OlOClICl  ! ! !
com.android.system.admin.OooOOOo ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
schemas.android.com - -
Request IP Region Type
www.google.com 173.194.112.212 United States - Mountain View DNS
www.androfox.com 91.216.163.131 Lithuania HTTP POST / DNS














































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.Zsone.A Panda
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab zsone Preventon Andr/Raden-A
Agnitum Protector Plus
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/Zsone PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat)  Android.Raden.B
Antiy-AVL Trojan/AndroidOS.Raden[SMS] RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.Zsone.A
Avast Android:Zsone-B Segurmatica
AVG Android_dc.AFXT Segurmatica KE HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Raden.v
Avira Android/Malmix.8 Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Raden.a Sophos Andr/Raden-A
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.Raden.aP SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.Zsone.A Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Zsone-5 TotalDefense AndroidOS/Raden.VGDbHEC
CMC TotalDefense Cloud AndroidOS/Trojan!CVcEGV
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Trojan-sms.Raden.Hrou





AndroidOS/Raden.A Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_ZSONE.A
Digital Patrol Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Raden.f TrustPort Android.Trojan.Zsone.A
DrWeb TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.Zsone.A (B) VBA32 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Raden.f
Epoolsoft Vexira









Ikarus Trojan.AndroidOS.Zsone Detected 48
Immunos Andr.Trojan.Zsone Undetected 41
Jiangmin Trojan/AndroidOS.ar Sum 89
K7 Antivirus






McAfee Name Distribution  
McAfee Artemis Artemis!944CBD53A174
McAfee GW Name Amount Score
Microsoft Malware Fam 1 0
NANO AntiVirus ZSone 18 3
NOD32 Android/Zsone.A Raden 17 2



















Allows an app to access approximate location derived from 
network location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, 
to record or perform processing on them
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES This constant was deprecated in API level 8
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION °
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources such as 
GPS, cell towers, and Wi-Fi. android/location/LocationManager;->getBestProvider
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/HttpURLConnection
android.permission.SEND_SMS android/telephony/gsm/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage




Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.admob.android.ads.AdMobActivity  ! ! "
com.mj.iMatch.IMatch ! ! !





Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.admob.android.ads.analytics.InstallReceiver  ! ! !
com.mj.utils.MJReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
schemas.android.com - -
mm.admob.com 70.32.132.54 United States - Mountain View
a.admob.com 165.193.245.52 United States - Mountain View
api.admob.com 165.193.245.41 United States - Mountain View
r.admob.com - -
Request IP Region Type
api.admob.com 165.193.245.41 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS
r.admob.com - - DNS
mm.admob.com 70.32.132.54 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS




GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Location_Last_get Retrieve last phone location
SMS 
Activities
SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Intercept Intercept SMS
SMS_Send Send "M6307AHD" to 10621900 
Send "aAHD" to 10626213
Send "95pAHD" to 106691819
Send "58#28AHD" to 10665123085
Monitor 
Activities
GPS_Spy Spy GPS states
Location_Spy Spy location
File 
































Antivirus Result Antivirus Result
Ad-Aware Android.Trojan.Zsone.A Panda Generic Malware #
Adobe Malware Classiﬁer PathFinder Malware
Aegislab zsone Preventon Andr/Raden-A
Agnitum Trojan.AndroidOS.Zsone.A # Protector Plus Trojan.AndroidOS.Zsone.A #
AhnLab-V3 Android-Malicious/Zsone PSafe Antivirus
ALYac Qihoo 360 Trojan.Generic
Anchivia Quick Heal (Cat) Android.Raden.A *
Antiy-AVL NO MALWARE $ RHBVS
Anvisoft Rising
Anvisoft Cloud Rising Cloud
ArcaVir SecureIT Android.Trojan.Zsone.A
Avast Android:Raden-D [Trj] *^ Segurmatica
AVG Generic5_c.EVK *, 
Android_mc.GEB *
Segurmatica KE HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Raden.v
Avira Android/Malmix.16 * Solo
AVware Trojan.AndroidOS.Raden.a Sophos Andr/Raden-A
Baidu Trojan.AndroidOS.Raden.AF * SUPERAntiSpyware
BitDefender Android.Trojan.Zsone.A Team Cymru
Bkav The Cleaner
ByteHero The Hacker
ClamAV Andr.Trojan.Zsone * TotalDefense AndroidOS/Zsone.A *£
CMC TotalDefense Cloud AndroidOS/Trojan!CYaEGV *,  
AndroidOS/Trojan!CbaEGV *
Comodo Malware Tencent Dos.Trojan-sms.Raden.Dzuc *
Comodo Cloud Malware Trend Micro AndroidOS_ZSONE.A, 
Android.0427E578
Cyren AndroidOS/GenBl.16C69031!Olympus, * 
AndroidOS/Zsone.A *£
Trend Micro-Housecall AndroidOS_ZSONE.A
Digital Patrol Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Zsone.a *£ TrustPort Android.Trojan.Zsone.A
DrWeb Android.SmsSend.110.origin # TT Livescan
EmsiSoft Android.Trojan.Zsone.A (B) VBA32 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Zsone.a *£
Epoolsoft Vexira Trojan.AndroidOS.Zsone.A #
eScan Android.Trojan.Zsone.A[ZP] VirIT eXplorer Android.Trj.Raden.M *
F-Mirc VIRobot Android.Trojan.Zsone.A[b]
F-Prot AndroidOS/Zsone.A *£ VirusBuster Trojan.AndroidOS.Zsone.A #
F-Secure Trojan:Android/Zsone.A # Zillya!
FileMedic Zoner Antivirus Trojan.AndroidOS.Zsone.A







Immunos Andr.Trojan.Zsone Undetected 29
Jiangmin Trojan/AndroidOS.ao * Sum 89
K7 Antivirus Trojan ( 00352b231 ) #




Name Distribution  
MalwareBytes
McAfee Generic.hu # Name Amount Score
McAfee Artemis Artemis!16C69031A489 * SMSSend 1 0
McAfee GW Generic.hu # SMStiBook 
(alias) 1 3
Microsoft Trojan:AndroidOS/Raden.A # Hippo 1 0
NANO AntiVirus Trojan.Android.Raden.dgeliw # ZSone 27 3
NOD32 Android/Zsone.A Raden 14 2
NoraLabs NoraScan Malmix 1 0
Norman Suspicious_Gen3.ACPZY * Generic Malware 14 1

















Allows an app to access approximate location derived from network 
location sources such as cell towers and WI-FI
android.permission.INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
Allows an application to monitor incoming SMS messages, to 
record or perform processing on them
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES This constant was deprecated in API level 8
android.permission.SEND_SMS Allows an application to send SMS messages
Used Permissions Description API calls
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION °
Allows an app to access precise location from location sources such as GPS, 
cell towers, and Wi-Fi. android/location/LocationManager;->getBestProvider
android.permission.INTERNET java/net/HttpURLConnection
android.permission.SEND_SMS android/telephony/gsm/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage




Activities Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.admob.android.ads.AdMobActivity  ! ! "
com.RZStudio.iMine.Mine ! ! !





Receivers Used Provided by Android
Provided by 
Third-Parties
com.admob.android.ads.analytics.InstallReceiver  ! ! !
com.RZStudio.iMine.SmsReceiver ! ! !







Hardcoded URLs IP Region
schemas.android.com - -
mm.admob.com 70.32.132.54 United States - Mountain View
a.admob.com 165.193.245.52 United States - Mountain View
api.admob.com 165.193.245.41 United States - Mountain View
r.admob.com - -
Request IP Region Type
api.admob.com 165.193.245.41 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS
r.admob.com - - DNS
mm.admob.com 70.32.132.54 United States - Mountain View HTTP GET / DNS




GPS_Get Retrieve GPS information
Location_Get Retrieve current phone location
Location_Last_get Retrieve last phone location
SMS 
Activities
SMS_Analysis Analysis SMS messages
SMS_Intercept Intercept SMS
SMS_Send Send "YXX1" to 106601412004 (2 times)
Send "921X1" to 1066185829 (2 times)
Send "C *X1" to 1066953930
Monitor 
Activities
GPS_Spy Spy GPS states
Location_Spy Spy location
File 





unix-compress Compress a ﬁle
unix-mkdir Make a directory
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